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Civil Military Operations (CMO) has often been blamed for the politicization of 
the armed forces and a loss of civilian control. This thesis confronts this traditional 
approach and argues that CMO need not lead to these outcomes.  It introduces democratic 
civilian control of the armed forces, a well-established military mission, and civilian and 
military expertise as the basic requirements for the application of CMO. If the 
requirements are fulfilled, a multiplier effects starts giving legitimacy to the government, 
consolidating the democratic process and increasing civilian control over the armed 
forces. 
 
 This thesis examines Ecuador as a case study. Ecuador fulfills partially the 
requirements for the application of CMO. The State's structure allows democratic civilian 
control. There is a well-established mission: the north frontier of Ecuador has become a 
"gap" in the national security system that demands the assistance of the armed forces. But 
there is lack of civilian and military expertise in the application of CMO. 
 
The demand of CMO in the north frontier can be the perfect scenario for training 
and education in Civil Military Affairs, fulfilling the requirement of expertise and thus 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Ecuador has been known as an island of peace to its citizens. During the last five 
years, insecurity and instability has risen to unprecedented levels. A gap in the north 
frontier has caused the peace to vanish.  The infiltration or subversive elements, 
dissidents and members of various Colombian guerrilla movements have breached the 
Northern Frontier. This thesis explores the concept of applying Civil Military Operations 
(CMO) to secure Ecuador's Northern Frontier.  The purpose is to determine whether the 
application of CMO would be an effective means of stopping the infiltration of 
Colombian guerrilla and criminal activities at the northern border. The study will also 
address the possible effects of CMO—in terms of civilian control of the armed forces—to 
national security, nation building processes and the development of democracy. 
 
Civil Military Operations are military missions in which the armed forces 
concentrate on security and development at the same time. According to the conventional 
theoretical approach of democratic civilian control over the military, the civilian sector is 
responsible for internal roles and missions—such as nation building processes social 
development.  Military assumption of these responsibilities presents a risk to a 
democratic regime. This study challenges this theoretical approach and proposes that 
CMO are an effective means of achieving democratic consolidation. These types of 
operations have to be studied, analyzed and understood before deciding whether to 
recommend or reject their application.  Unfamiliarity with CMO may lead to overlooking 
an opportunity to employ a valuable tool for development. This thesis will present 
important advantages, as well as disadvantages, of civil military operations using 
Ecuador as a case study.  
 
In Ecuador's history, the military has had a preponderant role in shaping the 
political arena. Various dictatorships, authoritarian rules, and coups have marked its 
history. In 1979, Ecuador returned to democracy after several years of military rule. Since 
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then, Ecuadorian civil-military relations have always been sensitive issues. In the mid-
1990s democracy was once again tested and civil-military relations were under pressure, 
since 1996 no elected president has finished his mandatory term. In this scenario, a new 
threat was also developing—the advance of Colombian guerrillas into Ecuador through 
the northern border. The guerrillas had used the area for supplies and recuperation since 
the mid-1990s, but now they were coming in greater numbers. Beginning in 2002, the 
insurgence has established a presence in the Sucumbios village, as well as a radio station 
for broadcasting their propaganda. Many frightened residents are selling their belongings 
and moving away from the border.1  
 
This thesis introduces the basic concept of CMO as it could be employed in any 
country. The analysis proposes a legal framework for an initial degree of civilian 
democratic control, the establishment of a well-defined military mission to respond an 
internal/external threat or a natural disaster, and civil and military training as 
prerequisites for engaging CMO as a means to consolidate and fortify democracy.   
 
The premise herein is that Ecuador must employ all state institutions to reestablish 
security in the north. The lack of infrastructure and the great poverty in the region attest 
to the need for development. CMO would help the government achieve security and 
begin development.  If the goals of security and development are met, then CMO would 
aid the development of democracy and would not be a risk to it.  
 
This study is divided in two parts. The first part (chapters I and II) is an analysis 
of the theoretical debate about civil military operations as it pertains to civilian control 
over the armed forces, building nation processes and democratic consolidation. Special 
emphasis is given to the confrontation between the conventional approach, which denies 
internal roles and missions to the armed forces, and the view that the armed forces, as a 
                                                 
1 “Colombia civil war drifts south into Ecuador,” Christian Science Monitor, www.reliefweb.int, 23, 
Jul, 2002. 
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State institution, can be involved in internal roles and missions. This study presents CMO 
technically and defines the different missions that compose CMO, according to U.S. 
Army doctrine. Once the different approaches toward internal roles of the armed forces 
are identified, and the concepts of CMO are explained, then the next section covers and 
examination of whether or not CMO is detrimental to a democratic regime. The second 
chapter identifies the basic requirements needed for the application of CMO to initiate a 
democratic consolidation process. This chapter focuses on the theoretical aspects of CMO 
and will become the basis for establishing major arguments discussed in the third chapter.  
 
Using Ecuador's recent history as a case study, the second part (chapter III) will 
explore the current situation of the country to evaluate whether Ecuador is ready to apply 
civil military operations as a method for closing the gap in the northern frontier and to 
determine the appropriate level of democratic civilian control. This chapter will highlight 
the significant aspects of civil-military relations since the mid-1990s. To gain a recent 
historical perspective, this second part includes a synopsis of the overthrown of President 
Abdalá Bucarám (February 1997); the promulgation of the new Constitution (Jun 1998); 
and, the military coup and posterior forced resignation of former President Jamil Mahuad 
(Jan 2000). These events are considered to be both causes and outcomes of the 
development of Ecuadorian civil-military relations. How these political events impacted 
the northern border situation is also addressed.  With a historical perspective pertaining to 
the northern border crisis, this chapter next explores the Colombian guerrilla threat and 
its contribution to the instability, insecurity and lack of development in the area. The 
essential purpose of this thesis—a vision for how civil military operations can be 
instituted—is presented here.  Specific tasks, roles and missions necessary to accomplish 
this are identified for both civilian and military personnel.  
 
The conclusion merges the historical facts about civilian control in Ecuador, the 
theoretical propositions about CMO, and the actual situation of the northern border, in 
order to either recommend or reject the implementation of CMO. The focus is on 
 3
determining the feasibility of applying of these operations relative to civilian control over 
the military, building national processes and strengthening democracy in Ecuador, as a 
means of stopping the negative effects of the Colombian conflict.  
 4
II. CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CIVILIAN CONTROL, 
HOW TO CONCILIATE BOTH CONCEPTS 
 
In the mid-1950s, Samuel Huntington opened the discussion about civil military 
relations in his book "The Soldier and the State". Later on, in the post-1974 period, the 
re-democratization era, or in Huntington's term, the "third wave" of global democratic 
expansion2, civilian democratic control over the armed forces became recognized as one 
of the cornerstones of democracy.  
 
The conventional theoretical approach of civilian democratic control states that 
democratic control is most likely sustained when military missions and roles are oriented 
toward external defense. It is argued that military involvement in internal missions is 
likely to politicize the military and the ability of civilians to resolve national problems is 
questioned.3  
 
This chapter will introduce civil military operations as effective internal military 
mission, and it will demonstrate that the application of these military operations is not 
harmful to democracy as long as certain fundamental requirements are met. To 
understand the value of these internal missions, this chapter begins by examining the 
concepts of internal roles and civilian democratic control. Once the relation between 
these concepts is established, civil military operations and their value for democratic 
consolidation are explained. The main purpose of this chapter is to determine the basic 
requirements for the application of civil military operations without risking democracy.  
 
                                                 
2Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy, Toward Consolidation, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 
1999, pg. 1. 
3 David R. Mares, “Latin American Economic Integration and Democratic Control of the Military, Is 
there a symbiotic relationship?,” in David Pion - Berlin, Civil Military Relations in Latin America, New 
Analytical Perspectives, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg. 226. 
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 A. INTERNAL ROLES AND THE ARMED FORCES 
 
The traditional theoretical view of democratic civilian control maintains that 
military involvement in internal roles is negative for achieving control over the armed 
forces. This section debates this argument and discusses the importance of focusing on 
who commands the military institution, instead of on which activities are exercised by the 
military, in order to achieve control over the armed forces. 
   
The armed forces must be conceived as a state institution. Once established as 
such, then professionalization becomes imperative to institutionalizing the organization; 
professionalism is the seed of military institutionalization. With the professionalization of 
the armed forces, the military becomes a state organism with the specific task of 
managing the use of violence in a modern state.  
 
"If it were necessary to give a precise date to the origin of the military profession, 
August 6, 1808 would have to be chosen."4 On that date, the Prussian government 
established the basic standard of professionalism in the armed forces; since then, the 
armed forces have focused on the direction, operation, and control of a human 
organization, whose primary function is the application of violence5.  
 
The function of this institution "is performed by a public bureaucratized 
profession expert in the management of violence and responsible for the military security 
of the State... The continuing objective performance of the professional function gives 
rise to a continuing professional welt-anschauung or professional 'mind'. The military 
                                                 
4 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Eighteen Print, 
2001, pg. 30. 
5 Ibid.  pg. 11. 
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mind in this sense, consist of the values, attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the 
performance of the professional function."6 
 
In the conceptualization of professionalism, Huntington distinguishes expertise, 
responsibility and corporateness as the main characteristics of a profession. "In the 
modern state, the increasing demands for administration rest on the increasing complexity 
of civilization and push towards bureaucratization."7 The armed forces are transformed 
by professionalism into a hierarchical bureaucracy; a fundamental public institution 
constituent of the Modern State. Like any other bureaucracy, once it is established, it 
becomes a power instrument of the first order for the ones who control that bureaucratic 
apparatus.8 In other words, control is not related to a certain activity, but to the 
commander or leadership. 
 
Huntington explains expertise, remarking that, a professional man is an expert 
with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human behavior, one with 
prolonged education and experience so as to acquire his expertise.9 Thus, the question is, 
if professionalism of the armed forces started during the 19th century in Western Europe, 
the 20th century in United States, and at the earliest, the 1920s in almost all South 
America, and it is just in the mid-1950s that the field of civil-military relations opened to 
discussion, then what kind of values marked the military mind before the 1950s? 
Professionalization of the armed forces without the values of civilian democratic control 
is risky for democracy and might be an explanation for the lack of control and rise of 
military regimes in Latin America.  
 
                                                 
6 Ibid. pg. 61. 
7 Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press, New York, 1946, pg. 212. 
8 Ibid. pg. 228. 
9 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Eighteen Print, 
2001, pg. 8. 
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Huntington recognizes expertise, corporateness and social responsibility as the set 
of values of the military mind in military professionalism. "The motivations of the officer 
are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft to 
the benefit of society."10 Thus, "a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry 
out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the 
state."11 Huntington only needs professionalism to achieve control of the military. This 
approach, however, takes as a fact that civilians govern nations, eluding the notion that 
the military may govern too.12 
 
In the analysis of Latin American armed forces, Alfred Stepan identifies the 
expanded roles of the armed forces as the "new professionalism of internal security and 
national development."13 With the evolution of society, the modern state needs 
professional armed forces, and the management of violence requires a thorough 
knowledge of economic, political and social subjects in order to respond to the current 
needs of the society. Nevertheless, without a set of democratic values, where civilian 
control is instructed and assimilated by the armed forces, "professionalism as expertise is 
somewhat more likely to promote intervention than the acceptance of civilian control."14 
"One aspect of professionalism in Latin America context leaves much to be desired: the 
level of social responsibility."15  
 
                                                 
10 Ibid. pg. 15. 
11 Ibid. pg. 84. 
12 Ernesto Lopez, “Latin America, Objective and Subjective Control Revisited,” in David Pion - 
Berlin, Civil Military Relations in Latin America, New Analytical Perspectives, The University Of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg. 94. 
13 Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” in 
Armies & Politics in Latin America, Homes & Meier, New York, 1986, pg. 136.  
14 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldier in Politics, pg. 53. 
15 Ernesto Lopez, "Latin America, Objective and Subjective Control Revisited", in David Pion - 
Berlin, Civil Military Relations in Latin America, New Analytical Perspectives, The University Of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg. 96. 
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Expertise and social responsibility become the roots for "patriotic officers." The 
former commander of the Argentine army, General Onganía, later a coup leader, clearly 
articulated these themes in a 1960 speech to the officers and cadets at West Point: 
Obedience is due a government when its power is derived from the people, 
and pursues the constitutional precepts set forth by the people, for the 
people. This obedience, in the last instance, is due to the constitution and 
the law, and should never be the result of the mere existence of men or 
political parties who may be holding office because of fate or 
circumstances. It should therefore be clear that the duty of rendering such 
obedience will have ceased being absolutely requirement if there are 
abuses in the exercise of legal authority that violate the basic principles of 
a republican system of government, when this is done as a result of exotic 
ideologies, or when there is a violent breakdown in the balance of 
independence of the branches government, or when constitutional 
prerogatives are used in such way that they completely cancel out the 
rights and freedoms of the citizens.16 
 
During the 1960s Latin America shifted the professionalization process and 
experimented with professionalizing internal security and national development.  The 
new professionalization was manifested in a changed military function—from external to 
internal security.  This change was prompted by a change in the attitude of the populace 
toward their government—from accepting its legitimacy to challenging it.  The military 
required interrelated political skills, which contributed to the role expansion of the armed 
forces and military political managerialism.17     
 
Eric Nordlinger describes the military managerialism as “praetorianism's basic 
rationale.”  
A military mentality that believes in a special responsibility, a crucial 
mission that transcends their obligations to existing authorities... Particular 
coups are justified by charging the former civilian incumbents with a 
shorter or longer list of performance failures. The soldiers almost 
                                                 
16 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldier in Politics, pg. 19. 
17 Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion", in 
Armies & Politics in Latin America, Homes & Meier, New York, 1986, pg. 138. 
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invariably claim that constitutional principles have been flouted by the 
corrupt, arbitrary, or illegal actions of the civilian incumbents. They are 
also commonly accused of having acted contrary to the national interest by 
allowing subversive groups to threaten the country's internal security, by 
fomenting class and communal conflicts and thereby encouraging political 
disorder and violence, by adopting policies that resulted in low economic 
growth rates, widespread unemployment, and inflationary spirals, or by 
failing to undertake programs of socioeconomic modernization and 
reform.18  
 
In this instance, he concept of national interest clashes with the concept and 
values of civilian democratic control. 
 
The concept of national interest became the basis of the National Security 
Doctrine, famous in Latin American during the 1960s, 70s and 80s. This doctrine, rooted 
in "praetorianism's basic rationale," was used to justify a shift—where the armed forces' 
expertise, corporateness and social responsibility focused on internal roles, instead of 
only external, to protect the national interest. Under the National Security Doctrine, the 
military became the institution ultimately responsible for Latin American security and 
development. The armed forces became responsible for the destiny of the region.  This 
change was prompted by a communist incursion into the heart of the system. Based on 
this, the accumulation of economic and political power by Latin American military 
leaders was fully justified.  Furthermore, any decision they made in any realm of national 
life was not to be questioned, because questioning meant one was against national 
security and development.19   
 
"The global impact of this strategy was manifested by human rights violations in 
the context of the scorched earth policy, massacres, the phenomena of internal 
                                                 
18 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldier in Politics, pg. 20. 
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19 The Military in Latin America, Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support 
(CIDAI), Central American University (UCA), San Salvador, El Salvador, www.hartford-
hwp.com/archives/40/120.html, November 24 of 2002. 
displacement and refugee flight. The formation and conduct of civil patrols, the creation 
of development roles and model villages, and the establishment of a judicial order that 
supported and justified this policy."20 The military governments of Argentina, Chile, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala are examples of the application of the praetorian military mind 
in accordance with the national security doctrine exercised from the 1960s to the earliest 
1990s in Latin America.   
 
Both civilians and the military failed to study civil-military relations prior to the 
1950s.  This, combined with the lack of democratic values in "praetorianism's basic 
rationale," provides the reason for the development of National Security Doctrine.  The 
outcome for several countries was disastrous for democracy and detrimental to human 
rights.  
 
As a result of the disaster, the armed forces have been denied involvement in 
internal roles in some Latin American democracies.  Nevertheless, civilian democratic 
control still has not been established in many of these countries and elected officials thus 
do not have direct responsibility for external or internal roles currently exercised by the 
armed forces. As stated earlier, control is not related to a certain activity, but to the 
characteristics of the commander or leadership. At this stage it is important to 
differentiate internal roles from tutelary roles of the armed forces. Tutelary roles of the 
armed forces as praetorian officers, moderators, guardians or rulers,21 left hard lessons 
with catastrophic experiences in Argentina and Chile during the 1970s and 1980s, and 
Central America during the 1980s and 1990s. With the spread of democracy, respect for 
human rights, and the lessons learned from catastrophic experiences, tutelary roles of the 
armed forces are no longer acceptable. Nevertheless, it does not imply that military 
involvement in internal missions is anti-democratic. What is important is to identify who 
commands, which missions, under which rules and for what purposes, to determine 
                                                 
20 Violence in Guatemalan Society, shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ciidh/dts/natsec.html, November 25 of 
2002. 
21 See these terms in Nordlinger's book, Soldier in Politics, chapters 1 and 2. 
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whether internal missions are being used by the armed forces for tutelary roles, or as a 
supportive activity in a democratic regime.  
 
The assumption of internal roles by the armed forces does not harm democracy 
per se; what challenges democracy is the underlying reason for the assumption. With 
civilian democratic control, internal military missions can be established, but it is 
important that civilian democratic control remain over the process and the purpose. Thus, 
the first requirement for granting internal roles to the armed forces becomes evident: 
democratic civilian control. Only when the country is in democratic civilian control can 
internal roles be granted to the military.  As expressed above, the problem is not the 
activities of the military on behalf of development, but rather the leadership of the 
institution. If elected civilian authorities control the armed forces, then military 
involvement in internal roles is tolerable. A direct relation between the degree of civilian 
democratic control and effective internal military missions becomes evident in the 
societal health of the country. Thus, the first fundamental requirement for internal roles 
of the armed forces is democratic civilian control. 
 
B. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL  
 
Democratic control is a particular subset of 'civilian control.' It is clear 
from the Latin American experience that democracy per se does not 
guarantee civilian control of the military. Elsewhere I argue that 
democracy is compatible with various forms of civil-military relations. 
Only the liberal model of democracy requires civilian control of the 
military.22   
 
If one accepts that internal military missions and roles operatively are a function 
of the degree of civilian democratic control, then it is important to conceptualize civilian 
                                                 
22 David R. Mares, "Latin American Economic Integration and Democratic Control of the Military, Is 
there a symbiotic relationship?", in David Pion - Berlin, Civil Military Relations in Latin America, New 
Analytical Perspectives, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg. 226. 
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democratic control. "While 'civilian control' as practiced in the United States and Western 
Europe is generally taken as the standard against which civil-military relations in new 
democracies should be evaluated, there is no agreement on what in fact that standard is 
and how it should be measured."23 The following sections will focus on how to measure 
and standardize civilian democratic control. 
 
1. Behavioral Approach 
Samuel J. Fitch, in his article, "Military Attitudes Toward Democracy," indicates 
that "particularly for American political scientists, the behavioral approach has a strong 
appeal. In this view, what counts is not what military officers say, but what they do."24 In 
the behavioral approach, "military attitudes are central to assessing to what extent 
democratic norms of civil-military relations are accepted or contested, internalized or 
rejected."25 By observing the military attitude towards the decision-making processes, 
defining missions and roles, budgetary planning, or military adherence to democratic 
norms as examples, the degree of civilian democratic control can be determined. The 
perception of good or bad, pro or con attitudes is a subjective judgment, however, and 
difficult to measure.  Thus, this approach is not enough to evaluate the degree of civilian 
democratic control over the armed forces. 
 
2. Structural Approach 
Peter Gill, in his book Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State, 
uses a structural approach, described in chapters six, seven and eight (Autonomy I: 
Organization and Control of the Security Intelligence Agencies, Autonomy II: Principles 
and Institutions of Oversight, and Autonomy III: Overseeing the Executive, respectively), 
to provide four levels of oversight and control of intelligence agencies.  
                                                 
23 Samuel J. Fitch, "Military Attitudes toward Democracy in Latin America, How Do We Know If 
Anything Has Changed?", in David Pion - Berlin, Civil Military Relations in Latin America, New 
Analytical Perspectives, The University Of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg. 61. 
24 Ibid.  pg. 63. 
25 Ibid.  pg. 67. 
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 Making a parallel of the armed forces with other state institutions, such as the 
security or intelligence agencies, Thomas Bruneau advocates the need for a structural 
approach when analyzing the armed forces as a state institution under civilian control. 
Using Peter Gill's concept, but referring to control over the armed forces, Bruneau 
proposes first an organizational analysis, an inspection of the structure of the Ministry of 
Defense, and of the relations between the Minister of Defense and the General Staff.  
Here it is important to examine who reports to whom, who appoints the Minister of 
Defense, and the participation of civilian staff in that Ministry. Second, it is necessary to 
explore the internal workings of the armed forces, its rules and norms, to understand the 
system of selection, promotion and retirement of military personnel.26  
 
The third crucial element is to grasp the role of the Legislature, focusing on the 
budgeting process, policy making and oversight. The fourth component of this structural 
approach is to examine how military roles and missions are determined. In this area there 
must be group participation between civilians and military officers, where the balance of 
power is fundamental. Finally, it is essential to have civilian control over the intelligence 
services as well.  
 
These five areas constitute tools for an objective approach to assessing civil-
military relations in a democracy. These, combined with the behavioral, or subjective 
approach of J. Samuel Fitch, configure a proper instrument to measure the degree of 
democratic civilian control over the armed forces. How does one define what is "proper" 
in measuring the degree of civilian control? How does one standardize democratic 
civilian control?  
 
 
                                                 
26 Thomas C. Bruneau, Ministries of Defense and Civil-Military Relations, The Center for Civil-
Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, August 2001. 
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"Maximizing civilian control in a democracy involves limiting the areas of state 
policy in which the armed forces hold ultimate jurisdiction."27 Ernesto Lopez introduces 
the concept of autonomization as "the high degree of independence from society and 
public figures that military institutions have enjoyed regarding their performance and 
decisions, their capacity of defining on their own terms missions, goals, doctrines, and 
modes of relation with the world of politics. This capacity sooner or later makes them 
politically powerful actors when compared to their civilian counterparts."28  
 
The negative relation becomes evident; the more the autonomy of the armed 
forces the less the civilian control. Harold Trinkunas, in his article "Crafting Civilian 
Control," argues that, "[the] presence or absence of civilian control of the armed forces 
can be measured by the shape of the jurisdictional boundaries separating civilian and 
military authority with in the state."29 Trinkunas defines these boundaries "by the degree 
of military participation in the state policy making and by the degree of autonomy 
enjoyed by the armed forces in their operations."30 Although the article opposes military 
internal roles, the approach is valid and compatible with internal roles as civil-military 
operations because it stresses the leadership role rather than the function. Trinkunas 
identifies three different types of regimes in standardizing civilian control: regime 
persistence,31 weak institutionalized32 and strong institutionalized control.33 
                                                 
27 Harold A. Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela", in David Pion - 
Berlin, Civil Military Relations in Latin America, New Analytical Perspectives, The University Of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg. 163. 
28 Ernesto Lopez, "Latin America, Objective and Subjective Control Revisited", in David Pion - 
Berlin, Civil Military Relations in Latin America, New Analytical Perspectives, The University Of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg. 95. 
29 Harold A. Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela", in David Pion - 
Berlin, Civil Military Relations in Latin America, New Analytical Perspectives, The University Of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg. 174. 
30 Ibid.  pg. 174. 
31 "Regime persistence... is a case of a country that lacks civilian control of the armed forces but has 
managed to sustain civilian rule... the armed forces continue to play a significant role in public policy... 
Furthermore, the armed forces continue to control internal security and external defense policy." In Harold 
A. Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela", in David Pion - Berlin, Civil 
Military Relations in Latin America, New Analytical Perspectives, The University Of North Carolina Press, 
Chapel Hill, 2001, pg.  175.  
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32 "Weak institutionalized civilian control... civilians dominate all aspects of political life not directly 
An analysis and measure of civilian control will be applied to the case study in 
Chapter III. The Fitch and Bruneau approaches will be used as an input, and the output 
will be measures according to Trinkunas' scope. By this exercise, it is possible to give an 
accurate evaluation of the degree of democratic civilian control in any country.  
 
C. CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS 
 
The zone between war and peace is also a gray area: some specialists are 
concerned about the use of force; and others interested in economic 
development or foreign policy over time; but few consider these facets 
jointly and carefully.34 
 
The U.S. armed forces has considered this gray area for at least several decades. 
"There has been a growing body of doctrine that discusses nontraditional military 
activities within the framework of the terminology in vogue: stability operations and 
counterinsurgency in the 1960s, low-intensity conflict in the 1980s, and operations other 
than war, military operations other than war, and stability and support operations 
today."35 
 
                                                 
related to security, and the armed forces are dominant in the area of external defense, exhibiting strong 
professional autonomy." Harold A. Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela", in 
David Pion - Berlin, Civil Military Relations in Latin America, New Analytical Perspectives, The 
University Of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg.  175.  
33 "Strong institutionalized civilian control... exists when civilians dominate most areas of policy 
making but share authority with the military over some aspects of external defense policy in the interest of 
maximizing the effectiveness of armed forces' war-fighting capabilities." In Harold A. Trinkunas, "Crafting 
Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela", in David Pion - Berlin, Civil Military Relations in Latin 
America, New Analytical Perspectives, The University Of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg.  
176.  
34 Karen Guttieri, Leading by Example: Civil Military Relations in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
Delivered to the United Nations University Meeting, Civil-Military Issues in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 
Hamburg, October 2001. 
35 Lawrence A. Yates, Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring 
Themes, Military Review, Vol. LXXII No. 4 (July-Aug. 1997). 
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This growing body of doctrine in civil-military affairs had been put into practice 
all around the world. Examples, beginning with 1959, include: Lebanon, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, the Dominican Republic in 1965, Cambodia, Nigeria, Operation Just Cause 
and Promote Liberty in Panama, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold 
Democracy in Haiti, and, most recently, Afghanistan. All these operations have a 
common denominator: a high level of civilian and military interaction. Civil-military 
relations, or civil-military affairs, "might be broadly defined as a 'complex of behavior in 
which civilian and military interaction takes place', or more specifically defined in terms 
of the equilibrium between civil and military institutions."36    
 
There are different kinds of civil military operations, the most known are: 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, foreign national support, populace and resources 
support, and civil action. This section focuses on describing CMO, and in particular, the 
operations that can be implemented in the northern border of Ecuador to bring security 
and development to that region.  
 
"The Americans have developed a fully articulated doctrine derived from doctrine 
on military government that now serves as a template for other nations and multilateral 
organizations."37 The U.S. Army Special Operations Manual, FM 41-10 Civilian Affairs 
Operations, will be used as the guideline to identify the basic concepts, values and 
components involved in the application of civil-military operations. The concepts 
extracted from this manual must be adapted to broaden their application. The manual is 
oriented toward U.S. military personnel, but with some basic adaptations, this instruction 
can also be useful to any country. It is important to note that this manual, or military 
doctrine, is used by the United States to instruct Latin American military and civilian 
personnel in the application of civil-military operations in the region.  
                                                 
36 Karen Guttieri, Leading by Example: Civil Military Relations in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
Delivered to the United Nations University Meeting, Civil-Military Issues in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 
Hamburg, October 2001. 
37 Karen Guttieri, The Civil Dimension of Strategy, in press for the date. 
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 Civil-Military Operations (CMO) is designed to "encompass the relation between 
military forces, civil authorities and people in a friendly or occupied country." These 
operations may include support "in civil emergency situations resulting from natural 
disaster, unrest, or enemy attack."38 Civilian Assistance (CA) operations, i.e., CMO, are 
composed of five tactical activities: Populace and Resources Control (PRC),39 Foreign 
National Support (FNS),40 Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Military Civic Action (MCA), 
and Civil Defense (CD). This section will not analyze PRC and FMS tactical activities 
because these two operations are oriented toward military activity outside the country of 
origin. The operations material of this study is oriented toward activities inside the 
country of origin.  
 
Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations involve "short-range programs aimed at 
ending or alleviating present suffering. HA is usually conducted in response to natural or 
man-made disasters, including combat... HA is designed to supplement or complement 
the efforts of HA civil authorities or agencies that have primary responsibility for 
providing HA. This type of assistance must complement without duplicating…"41 
Humanitarian assistance, used particularly to confront natural disaster, is needed when 
                                                 
38 Civil Affairs Operations, Western Hemisphere Institute for Security and Cooperation, Commander 
U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Jun 1999, pg. 3-14.  
39 Populace and Resources Control (PRC) are according to the manual. "Civilian and military 
authorities exercise PRC. PRC operations provide security to the populace, deny personnel and material to 
the enemy, mobilize the population and material resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of the 
enemy agents. Populace controls include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, 
and resettlement of villager. Resources control measures including licensing, regulations or guidelines, 
checkpoints (for example road blocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. Most 
military operations will employ some type of PRC measures." Ibid. Pg. 10-6. These operations include 
Dislocated Civilians Operations (DC) Pg. 10-7. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Pg.10-14.  
40 Foreign National Support (FNS), according to the manual. " The preferred means for closing 
the gap in CSS requirements is to get appropriate goods and services locally. This acquisition is 
accomplished through foreign nation support (FNS). FNS refers to identifying, coordinating, and acquiring 
foreign nation (FN) resources such as supplies, materiel, and labor to support US forces and operations. In 
some theaters, specific terms describe categories of FNS. HNS refers to support a friendly country provides 
for US military operations conducted within its borders based on mutually concluded agreements. HNS 
includes planning, negotiating, and acquiring such support. FNS may include support from countries that 
have no mutual agreements." Ibid. Pg. 10-2. 
41 Ibid pg. 3-3.   
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local civilian authorities, such as governors or mayors, do not have at their disposition the 
resources to overcome the crisis. For countries with lack of economic resources, these 
military operations are often considered vital, and the practice of joint operations with 
another country's armed forces is common. 
Civil Defense (CD) operations "are primarily a responsibility of government 
agencies. Civil-military problems are reduced when a government can control and care 
for its people during crisis. The effectiveness of civil defense planning and organization 
has a direct impact on other CMO. Support of civil defense may be conducted as MCA; 
HA in civil defense planning aids military support during disaster relief."42 Civil Defense 
(CD) operations share the same principles of no duplicated activity, of short duration, and 
complementarily to other governmental agencies as HA operations. Another requirement 
for the application of these two operations (CD and HA) is the need to deploy 
governmental agencies first, only in the case of incapability are military operations 
allowed.  
 
HA and CD operations are important tools to maintain order and overcome 
natural emergencies. These operations have considerable value for democracy. Relief 
from local emergencies in a short time, and with the least amount of damage (i.e., 
possibly preventing excessive damage), demonstrates that the State is capable of bringing 
protection and safety to its citizens. In the case of national emergencies, effective HA and 
CD operations are even more valuable. During a state of emergency, or the enactment of 
emergency security laws, expertise in HA and CD are crucial for the respect of the rule of 
law and the protection of human rights. 
 
During substantial natural disasters wealthy countries, such as some in Europe 
and the United States, strong international agencies like the Red Cross, and various civil 
defense agencies within the national sphere all require the deployment of extraordinary 
budgeting, planning and logistic resources to overcome the crisis.  It is difficult for any 
                                                 
42 Ibid pg. 3-5. 
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country or agency to have all the resources needed at their disposal all the time. Proper 
preparation of HA and CD operations is indispensable for confronting an unexpected 
natural disaster.  
 
The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is a great example of 
how to employ governmental and military personal to manage natural disaster events. 
The most important lesson that FEMA offers is the use, in extreme situations, of military 
units under civilian command to support natural emergencies. The dialogue and 
interaction between civilian and military authorities during emergency planning 
processes is one way to insure civil control and improve civil-military relations. Thus, the 
application of HA and CD operations is an opportunity to exercise civilian democratic 
control. 
 
Like HA and CD operations, Military Civil Action (MCA) projects offer an 
opportunity to enhance the legitimacy of the state.  These projects are designed and 
intended to win support of local populations for government objectives and for the 
military. Properly planned and executed MCA results in popular support. MCA employs 
predominately indigenous military forces as labor and is planned as short-term projects... 
The Projects should be useful to the local populace at all levels in fields such as 
education, training public works, health and other activities which contribute to economic 
and social development. Improving the standing of the military with the civilian populace 
is a positive by-product of MCA... Developmental MCA projects require continuous 
support from government sources to be effective... Developmental MCA type focuses on 
the infrastructure of a developing nation and is long-term... it must address the need of 
the local people while gaining their support."43  
 
In these operations, the armed forces are in direct contact with civilians and 
civilian authorities. A requirement for the application of these military operations is to 
                                                 
43 Ibid. pg. 10-41. 
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have a military objective. This operation can not be employed under the justification of a 
lack of resources from national or local governments. The involvement of armed forces in 
civilian activities without a military objective can turn against democracy because the 
armed forces start to focus on non-military affairs. 
 
MCA is a challenge for the armed forces in developing countries. MCA questions 
civilian democratic control; MCA is a behavioral test where subordination is challenged 
at all the hierarchical levels. The DOD civilian authorities, together with local 
governments, are the ones who must design these operations. The design keeps military 
subordination within the realm of civilian control. Although the main goal of MCA is to 
achieve a military objective, the military objective has to be established by civilian 
authorities. This would be the best test of civilian control because it includes the 
definition of threats also. When using MCA as a test of civilian control, it is important to 
ensure that the basic requirements for the application of civil-military operations are 
determined first.  
 
D. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
 
The term 'consolidation' carries with it the implicit acknowledgment that 
democracy does not automatically follow from its replacement; rather, it 
has to be built up over time.44 
 
For countries that face both poverty and internal or external threats, MCA is a tool 
for security and development. By providing security and development the State earns 
more legitimacy, a key factor for the day-by-day process of democratic consolidation. 
Therefore, the implementation of MCA and CMO in general, under civilian democratic 
control, are tools for consolidating democracy. To understand the influence of CMO 
                                                 
44 Ernesto Lopez, "Latin America, Objective and Subjective Control Revisited", in David Pion - 
Berlin, Civil Military Relations in Latin America, New Analytical Perspectives, The University Of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg.  88. 
 21
under civilian democratic control, Juan Linz's relations of legitimacy, effectiveness and 
efficacy are cardinal points of reference. 
 
In his book, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Crisis, Breakdown & 
Reequilibration, Juan Linz explains legitimacy as, "the belief that in spite of 
shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any 
others..."45It is important to realize until citizens can change the system, they may 
tolerate negative experiences in security and development. The proper application of 
CMO is a positive factor in reducing negative experiences by supporting the primary 
needs of citizens, especially in the area of security disturbed by internal or external 
threats.    
 
"Legitimacy of a democratic regime rests on the belief in the right of those legally 
elevated to authority to issue certain types of commands, to expect obedience and to 
enforce them, if necessary, by the use of force."46 The use of force must follow the rule 
of law. That is why it is necessary to be careful when involving the military in internal 
roles. The misapplication of CMO can result in the loss of democratic legitimacy. Also, 
"legitimacy on the part of those who have direct control of the armed forces is 
particularly important."47 The use of CMO for political goals can convert the military 
into an effective tool for overthrowing a democratic regime. 
 
For Juan Linz, legitimacy is an outcome of effectiveness48 and efficacy.49 If CMO 
is effective and efficacious, then employing it in democracies in transition, or even in 
                                                 
45 Juan Linz, The breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibration, John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978, pg. 16. 
46 Ibid. pg. 17. 
47 Ibid. pg. 17. 
48 Effectiveness "is the capacity actually to implement the policies formulated with the desired 
results." In Juan Linz, The breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibration, John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978, pg. 22.. 
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49 Efficacy "refers to the capacity of a regime to fin solutions to the basic problems facing any political 
consolidated democracies that face great economic difficulties, can be a means to achieve 
its legitimacy. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philipe Schmitter, in their book Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule, Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, write about the 
"second" transition "socialization", that "involves a double stream, two independent but 
interrelated processes:"50 transitions toward "social democracy"51 and "economic 
democracy."52  
 
After the liberalization, transition and democratization processes, a second stage 
evolves, where, "democracy institutionalizes uncertainty, not only with respect to the 
persons and groups who will occupy positions of authority, but also with respect to the 
uses to which authority will eventually be applied."53 If the authority is not capable of 
finding solutions to the basic political and economical problems, or after finding them, is 
not capable of implementing them to obtain the desired outcomes, then the authority loses 
legitimacy. In other words, if there is a lack of effectiveness and or efficiency, the 
authority stands to lose legitimacy and the degree of democratic uncertainty rises. 
 
If, in this circumstance, the State also faces an external or internal threat, then the 
degree of uncertainty multiplies. CMO solves both problems simultaneously.  It allows 
                                                 
system (and those that become salient in any historical moment) that are perceived as more satisfactory 
than unsatisfactory by aware citizens." In Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Crisis, 
Breakdown & Reequilibration, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978, pg. 20. 
50 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philipe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986, p. 12. 
51 Social Democracy "consist of making the workers in factories, the students in schools and 
universities, the members of interest associations, the supporters of political parties, the clients of state 
agencies, even the faithful of churches, the consumers of products, the clients of professionals, the patients 
in hospitals, the users of parks, the children of families, etc., ad infinitum into citizens - actors with equal 
tights and obligations to decide what actions these institutions should take." In Guillermo O'Donnell and 
Philipe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986, p. 12.  
52 Economy Democracy "relates to providing equal benefits to the population from the goods and 
services generated by society: wealth, income, education, health, housing, information, leisure time, even 
autonomy, prestige, respect, and self determination." In Guillermo O'Donnell and Philipe Schmitter, 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1986, p. 12. 
53 Ibid. p. 11. 
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the leadership to restore order, thus providing security, and at the same time, aids the 
nation building process. Applying CMO properly raises the level of effectiveness and 
efficacy and returns legitimacy to the democratic authority, and thus decreases the level 
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--Definition of national threats by democratically elected civilian authorities. 
Military authorities have a role in the assessment, 
--Joint design of MCA and civilian design of HA and CD, and civilian command 
of CMO. 
Military Mission. This is a fundamental requirement. For MCA the existence of 
an internal or external threat is mandatory. Full support of the populations is also a 
necessity.  
Civilian and Military Expertise in CMO. This is a fundamental requirement. It is 
necessary to train both civilians and the military in the development of these operations to 
achieve this requirement. 
 Legal Base. This is both a fundamental and an operational requirement. The 
judicial order of the country establishes these operations. It is necessary for national 
emergency laws, armed forces' organic laws, or that which connects the executive 
branch's organic laws with special norms. The important point is that the tenet expressed 
in them must be followed. As an operational requirement for HA and DC, it is mandatory 
that all national and local government agencies have oversight of all natural disaster 
activity. 
 
The multiplying effect of CMO towards democracy is a cycle whereby the result 
of the initial application of CMO is the increase of legitimacy of the local and/or national 
government. If the region of a country experiences an internal or external threat, along 
with poverty, the lack of security and development will likely decrease the level of 
legitimacy of the elected civilian government; thus, the level of uncertainty toward 
democracy would rise. The first benefit of CMO is the restoration of a sense of security 
through establishing a military presence. At this point, it is necessary to highlight that a 
certain degree of civilian control is a basic requirement to control these operations, and 
also to ensure that the rule of law and the respect of human rights is honored. In this 
analysis respect for the rule of law is the only assumption. The risk of human rights 
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violations exists in any military or police involvement; nevertheless, this risk should not 
deter the use of armed forces in the search for solutions to regional difficulties.  
 
A second benefit to employing CMO is the development aid given to the region 
by civil works, medical assistance, and educational projects. Poverty is a cradle for 
violence and crime, and consequently, a source of insecurity. Poverty also decreases the 
level of legitimacy of the local and/or national government. This aid would restore 
security and alleviate the effects of poverty, resulting in restoring legitimacy to the 
elected civilian authority.   By engaging HA and DC to relieve the population of the 
consequences of natural disasters, the government exhibits effectiveness and efficacy and 
raises its level of legitimacy.  By engaging MCA to restore security and initiate 
development in a region affected by internal and/or external threats, again, a government 
raises its level of legitimacy. 
 
Following Linz's approach, legitimacy "contributes to the ultimate outcome: 
persistence and relative stability of the regime."54 In other words, the multiplying effect 
of CMO is an increase in the level of legitimacy of elected civilian authorities and an 
increase in democratic consolidation. If employing CMO helps to legitimize elected 
civilian authority, as well as legitimizes and consolidates a democratic regime, then 
civilian democratic control over the armed forces is reinforced.  
 
Finally, to conclude this analysis, it is necessary to understand how civilian 
control can be both the input and the output of the cycle (Figure 1.). Civilian control, or at 
least a certain degree of civilian control, presented as a basic requirement (see page 27), 
is mandatory. If the CMO basic requirements are respected, then it is possible to 
implement CMO and the multiplier cycle starts (see pg. 27 number 3). However, it is 
indispensable to emphasize that in order to develop a successful cycle, democratic 
                                                 
54 Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibration, John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978, pg. 18. 
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civilian control is indispensable. In the absence of democratic civilian control, training 
and education becomes paramount and the cornerstone for the application of CMO. 
Training and education in democratic values of civilian control can be instilled into the 
military mind, thus the importance of education and training as a requirement for the 
application of CMO. Once there is expertise in CMO, and the values of democratic 
civilian control are understood and spread, CMO can be applied, and the cycle able to 
start. 
 
In conclusion, for any country that faces poverty and internal or external threats, 
CMO is an effective tool to provide security and development, raise legitimacy and 
increase the degree of democratic consolidation. For the application and efficacy of 
CMO, the fulfillment of basic requirements is mandatory, as is the necessity of training 
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III. CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN ECUADOR SINCE THE 
MID-1990S 
Ecuador approved a new Constitution by plebiscite in 1978, and by 1979 had 
returned to democracy after several years of authoritarian rule. "The expansion of 
democratization, which began in Ecuador during the late 1970s, continued in Peru in 
1980, and spread from there to Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Central 
America."55 This process of "re-democratization" meant more than the establishment of 
simple "electoral democracies"56. 
 
The return to democracy meant, for Latin American countries, and particularly for 
Ecuador, the reestablishment of the rule of law, of human rights, access to free political 
representation, uncertain electoral outcomes, control of the state by political elected 
officials, and military subordination to the authority of elected officials.57 After a quarter 
century, how extensive or thorough is the level of democratic civilian control over the 
armed forces in Ecuador?  
 
This chapter will cover historical events since the mid-1990s in order to 
understand the current civil-military environment. Using a historical approach, the 
chapter will explore in detail the Constitutional crisis of 1996 and 2000. Based on these 
historical events, the next chapter will evaluate Ecuador, as a case study, in order to 
determine whether to recommend the implementation of CMO in Ecuador.  
 
                                                 
55 Felipe Aguero and Jeffrey Stark, Fault lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America, 
University of Miami Press, 1998, pg. 241. 
56 "A regime in which governmental officers are filled as a consequence of contested elections... This 
flawed conception of democracy privileges elections over other dimensions of democracy and ignores the 
degree to which multiparty elections may exclude significant portions of population from contesting for 
power or advancing and defending their interest, or may leave significant arenas of decision making 
beyond the control of elected officials." Felipe Aguero and Jeffrey Stark, Fault lines of Democracy in Post-
Transition Latin America, University of Miami Press, 1998, pg.  9 
57 Ibid. p. 11. 
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As the second chapter explained, civil-military operations can only be applied if 
the fundamental requirements are fulfilled. Thus the presentation of events in Ecuador 
since the mid-1990s will include information on how the country fulfills, or does not 
fulfill, the fundamental requirements. The overthrow of former presidents Bucarám and 
Mahuad are the low point in civil military relations and control of the armed forces since 
the return to democracy. It is important to study the events as they evolved to gain an 
understanding of the civilian and military mind set and of how consolidated the structure 
was that controlled and had oversight of the armed forces. Analyzing these points is 
indispensable to understanding the future of civil-military relations and the possibility for 
the use of CMO in Ecuador.  
 
A. ECUADOR 1996: BUCARAM´S OVERTHROW 
 
The overthrow of former President Bucarám, opened a fissure in civil-military 
relations and a gate for the re-politicization of the armed forces. Since 1979, the armed 
forces demonstrated, at least to the society in general, a medium level of democratic 
civilian control. The processes of state modernization and privatization were applied in 
the security sector directly affecting the armed forces, nevertheless, the armed forces 
never attempted to go against the Constitutional order. With the entrance of Bucarám into 
the political arena, and the failure of the Judicial Branch to control corruption, the civilian 
authorities and population asked the military for a Constitutional answer to the political 
crisis. Control over the armed forces started to break up in response to this request.     
 
Abdalá Bucarám Ortiz was born in Guayaquil in 1952 into a large, poor family. 
He became involved in politics at an early age, working in the campaigns of Guevara 
Moreno and Don Buca.58 His family, of Lebanese heritage, became one of the most 
influential political families during the 1970s. Bucarám started his political life as 
Guayaquil's general superintendent of the police in 1979. In 1982, after taking advantage 
                                                 
58 Michael L. Conniff, Populism in Latin America, The University of Alabama Press, 1999, pg.  153. 
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of his brother in law's--former President Jaime Roldós Aguilera—position, he became 
popular. Roldós tragically died during that year and Bucarám started his own political 
party: Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE). This was the political party that was in 
power after the dissolution of the former political party Concentración de Fuerzas 
Populares, leaded by his uncle Assad Bucarám—also known as Don Buca. 
 
In 1984 he was elected mayor of the second most important city of the country, 
his birth-city, Guayaquil. Always in conflict with former president Leon Febres Cordero, 
he was put in jail for defaming him. After his release on September 15, 1985, he decided 
to exile to Panama. On his return to Ecuador in 1988, he surprisingly managed to pass to 
the second round of the presidential elections. He participated again in 1992, but without 
success. In 1996, because of his extraordinary ability to incite riots and rouse the people, 
he became President of Ecuador, one of the youngest presidents in Latin America.59  
 
Abadalá Bucarám won the presidential elections with 54% of the electoral vote.  
Michael L. Conniff describes the elite reaction to his election: 
The elites, flabbergasted by Abdala's election, nevertheless declined to 
mount a coup attempt against him. For his part, he kept communication 
links with elites through Augusto de la Torre, a neo-liberal technocrat who 
served as a chairman of the Central Bank... Abadalá attempted to go even 
beyond this neo-liberal program by inviting Domingo Cavallo, a former 
Argentinean finance minister. Cavallo's discussion of convertibility and 
dollar-pegged currency caused anxiety among the economic elites and 
tended to divide the public opinion…60  
 
By implementing these decisions Bucarám started to do exactly the opposite of 
what he promised to do during the campaign. Soon he directed his effort to reduce the 
size of the State, and to adopt neo-liberal policies like privatization and deregulation of 
                                                 
59 Cidof Fundation, Abadalá Bucarám Ortiz's biography, 
http://www.cidob.org/bios/castellano/lideres/b-063.htm 
60 Michael L. Conniff, Populism in Latin America, The University of Alabama Press, 1999, pg.  154. 
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the public sector. Bucarám announced the privatization of the Telecommunications 
Company, Electric Company (EMETEL), and the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security 
(IESS).  
 
Bucarám was playing a double game.  On one hand, he formed the Economic 
Committee of Government, where he allied himself with the new economic elites; 
principally with one of the richest Ecuadorian businessmen, Alvaro Noboa, appointing 
him as head of this committee. On the other hand, in public, he continually affirmed his 
fight against the oligarchies. "Abadalá was eager to fulfill his campaign imagine of 
paternalism among the poor. His plan promised 400,000 low-cost houses and froze the 
retail price of cooking gas."61 
 
Personal, familial, and financial scandals combined with administrative chaos and 
nepotism to undermine Bucaram’s ability to govern.62 In only six months, Bucaram's 
popularity dropped to the lowest levels. Riots broke out in Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca, 
the three most important cities of the country, as people demanded his and his family's 
resignation. Bucarám managed to appoint family members to several key positions; 
corruption became a tonic in those spheres of power. The only possible outcome was 
evident, disenchantment in almost every social sector.   
 
In civil-military affairs, a conflict began during his short stay in power when "he 
apologized to Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru, for all the boundary problems that 
these two countries had had in the past. Most Ecuadorians thought that these acts 
demeaned the intellectual community and the dignity of the nation."63 In the military 
sphere, this was one of the first sources of tension. Accusations of corruption and the 
                                                 
61 Ibid. pg. 154. 
62 Cidof Fundation, Abadalá Bucarám Ortiz's biography, 
http://www.cidob.org/bios/castellano/lideres/b-063.htm 
63 Michael L. Conniff, Populism in Latin America, The University of Alabama Press, 1999, pg.  154. 
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generalized internal disorder had a direct effect on the relations between the former 
President and the armed forces, which resurfaced later.  
 
In this chaotic environment, on February 2, 1997, "Ecuador started a decisive test 
for his political future."64 First the fuel carriers committee declared a general strike, and 
Bucarám answered by removing 6 ministers. On February 3, former presidents, former 
presidential candidates, legislators, and leaders of the Coordinadora de Movimientos 
Sociales got together and demanded Bucaram's resignation.  The next day, the 
Coordinadora Política de Mujeres Ecuatorianas joined the fray, and on February 5, 
multitudes in the capital city streets where demanding his departure. Que se vaya 
Bucarám! Que se vaya Bucarám! was the cry. Meanwhile, 51 legislators announced that 
they would decide the future of the then President.65 In February 6, the National 
Congress enacted a long forgotten judicial decision, by which former president Velasco 
Ibarra was relived by Carlos Julio Arosemena in 1960.  It was article 100 of the 
Constitution, which allows revocation of power because of mental incapacity.66 Bucarám, 
also known as El Loco (the crazy man), finally did honor to his famous nickname, and 
after a prolonged congressional session, with 44 votes in favor and 34 against, the 
Congress declared him unable to govern because of his mental incapacity. 
 
Immediately, the attention turned to the armed forces. The political role of the 
armed forces became evident since they were considered guardians of democracy. 
Bucarám as "President" according to the Constitution67 had absolute authority over the 
armed forces and the police. Without delay, he ordered the armed forces to disobey the 
congressional resolution. At the same time, a new political actor entered the scene, Vice-
                                                 
64 http://www.hoy.com.ec/zhechos/hecho04.htm 
65 http://www.hoy.com.ec/zhechos/hecho04.htm 
66 Article 100 of the Constitution of Ecuador of 1979, reformed in 1996: "The President will stop in 
his functions and will let vacant his charge when: a) Finnish of the presidential term; b) Dead; c) By 
congressional acceptance of his resignation; d) Mental incapacity to govern declared by the Congress; e) 
Destitution or abandon of the charge declared by the Congress.  
67 Article 103. Lit. h) of the Constitution of Ecuador of 1979, reformed in 1996.  
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president Rosalia Arteaga.  She proclaimed herself President of Ecuador by invoking 
article 101 of the Constitution, which states that, in the absence of the President, the 
Vice-president will occupy the Office. Congress never expected her appearance before 
her political movement proclaimed Fabián Alarcón as new President of the country. In 
one day Ecuador had three presidents and sunk into the worst institutional crisis of the 
century.  It was reminiscent of earlier incidents, in 1859 and in 1883, when Ecuador had 
four Presidents simultaneously.68  
 
On February 7, uncertainty engulfed the country. Bucarám went to Guayaquil 
denying Alarcón's election, while in the capital city (Quito), Arteaga and Alarcón tried to 
convince the armed forces as to who was rightfully president according to the 
Constitution. The armed forces became the "judicial authority" which interpreted the 
Constitution and decided who was to be the President. On February 8, the verdict was 
announced: Arteaga was to be a “temporary” interim president until Congress elected the 
"definitive" interim president, who was to be in office until the elections for a new 
president in 1998. On February 9, Arteaga reluctantly argued that, Congress needed to 
first ammend the Constitution, but the verdict was already given, and on February 10, 
with a 57 to 43 vote, Alarcón was proclaimed the new President of Ecuador by the 
National Congress.  
 
By February 12, in spite of all the commotion, Ecuador "resolved" its institutional 
crisis without bloodshed. Days later, on February 16, Cesar Gaviria, Secretary General of 
the Organization of American States (OAS) pronounced: "It is a great satisfaction that the 
armed forces of that country had played such a positive role in a moment in which 
democracy seem to be in danger because of the rise of several persons proclaiming the 
presidency."69   
 
                                                 




By granting the arbitrator role to the armed forces in the decision to overthrow 
Bucarám, the civilians lost control.  Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the 
outcome came from a civilian political crisis, and that the civilians themselves called on 
the military to interpret the constitution and resolve the crisis. The extreme polarization 
of the political parties, the high level of corruption, and the passiveness of the Judicial 
Branch shook the foundation of democratic civilian control, which had been established 
since the return to democracy in 1979.   
 
B. ECUADOR 2000: MAHUAD´S OVERTHROWN 
 
The Ecuadorian crisis in 2000 was a military coup. The same factors as in 1996 
contributed to the crisis: corruption in the executive branch, passiveness in the judicial 
branch, polarization in the political arena, and this time, a legislative branch unable to 
govern during the crisis. The 2000 coup exposed a highly politicized portion of the army; 
a portion that even the armed forces itself was unable to control. It left the opportunity for 
a more preponderant role for the armed forces. 
 
Jamil Mahuad was born in the southern city of Loja on July 29, 1949. His heritage 
was Lebanese on his father's side, and German on his mother's. In 1979 he obtained a 
degree in Social and Political Science, and later his doctoral degree in Jurisprudence from 
the Catholic University of Quito. In 1989 he also obtained a Masters in Business 
Administration from Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. By 
1983, he already became Minister of Works and Human Resources in the government of 
former President Oswaldo Hurtado Larrea. In 1988 his political party, Democracia 
Popular (DP, Christian Democracy) nominated him for President, but he ran without 
success. He served two terms as legislator, (1986-1988 and 1990-1992), during which his 
political career started to take shape.  
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In 1992, when he was elected Mayor of the capital city, Quito, he began 
consolidating his position as one of the most promising political figures. In 1996 he won 
reelection based on his image as an honest and ethical man.   This reputation was 
confirmed when he took a stand against Bucarám and was one of the first to demand his 
resignation. Mahuad, as Mayor of Quito and "President of the Assembly of Quito," 
played a fundamental role in the leadership of the strike that overthrew Bucarám."70 His 
key position in the Assembly of Quito, his outstanding background and reputation 
propelled him to run once again for President.  
 
Once he was elected the country started to hope for a better future.  Mahuad was 
the first elected president under the new Constitution. He initiated his presidential term 
by establishing several new institutions created by the Constitutional Assembly. Once in 
office, Mahuad defined the goals of his government. The first goal was the construction 
of a peace treaty with Peru. The second goal was fiscal management—tight control of 
State expenditures and an agreement with the International Monetary Fund regarding 
loans. The third goal was economic growth through incentives for international 
investment. . With these proposals Mahuad hoped to fulfill his campaign promise of 
creating 900,000 work positions…71 
 
Mahuad showed expertise in international affairs. After being in office only two 
months, he set up six meetings with former Peruvian President Fujimori in order to draft 
a Peace Treaty.  The Treaty was signed on October 26, 1998, ending a territorial problem 
that went back to the initial formation of both countries. In spite of all his popularity in 
the political sphere, Mahuad could not resolve the economic crisis. 
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The ongoing economic crisis experienced by Ecuador is reflected in the following 
indicators: inflation rose to 60.7% in 1999, the highest in the Hemisphere, and in January 
2000, it climbed to 78.1%, the highest monthly inflation rate in 32 years. Ecuador's 
economy of approximately US$18 billion was largely dependent on foreign exchange 
earnings derived from oil, banana, shrimp, and flower exports. In March 1999, the 
government closed the bank system for one week because of the economic crisis. At the 
same time, gasoline prices soared 200%. This prompted a national taxi driver strike. The 
recession contracted the economy to 7.5%; its external debt exceeded US$13 billion. The 
rate of unemployment rose to 17% and 62.5% of its inhabitants were living below the 
poverty line.72  
 
On January 9, 2000, President Jamil Mahuad proposed the dollarization of the 
economy as a way of halting the country’s serious economic crisis, and, in particular, the 
decline in the sucre, which had fallen by 20% in one week. Over the course of one year, 
the value of the dollar rose from 7,000 to 29,000 sucres, more than 400%, the dollar price 
was finally fixed in 25.000 sucres. Ecuadorians protested the sudden loss of their 
purchasing power, speculation, and the escalation in the cost of living, corruption in the 
banking sector, and the series of failed government measures all contributed to the 
growing crisis.73 The social reaction was uncontainable. The indigenous movement that 
declared at the beginning of the year their intention to force the exit of the three powers74 
of the State, proclaimed a march to take control of the capital city and by January 15th 
more than ten thousand indigenous people were in Quito. 
           
Under these circumstances, the same phenomenon as that of the Bucarám 
overthrow took place. There were rioters in the streets demanding Mahuad's resignation.  
This time, however, the role of the armed forces was even more predominant, hence the 
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73 Ibid. 
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importance of examining the details of the events during those historical days. El 
Comercio, an important and objective Ecuadorian newspaper, published an inside report 
of the events.75    
 
On January 21, 2000, Colonel Lucio Gutierrez and Antonio Vargas announced, at 
the National Congress, a coup against former President Mahuad. "At 09:25 A.M., the 
country, taciturn, watched live how the military invited the indigenous people to enter 
Congress: a coup was forming, making the division of the military institution evident."   
Escuela Superior Politécnica del Ejército (ESPE) students—195 officers, 150 Cenepa 
veterans of the war with Peru, and soldiers who guard the Congress invited almost 7,000 
indigenous people in to occupy Congress' main building. At the same time, 400 officers, 
from second lieutenant to colonels, occupied Congress' meeting room and other sections 
of the Legislative Palace.   
 
Earlier that same day, about 7:30 A.M., there were some unusual movements at 
the ESPE, as a captain commandeered three buses for use in preparing for the entrance of 
the indigenous people who were commanded by 150 Cenepa officers. The heroes of the 
Cenepa conflict represented moral force and were a great influence between the 
indigenous people and the soldiers and policemen who guard Congress. The plans for this 
event began approximately two months earlier in the ESPE.  The officers intended to stop 
the corruption. Despite their attempts at secrecy, Army Intelligence detected the agitation. 
On January 17, the Chief of the Armed Forces, General Telmo Sandoval, in an 
unexpected visit to ESPE stipulated that the General Staff was required to respect the 
Constitution. This disillusioned the young officers. 
 
The attitude of the ESPE officers jolted the War Academy. On January 21, at 9:30 
A.M., 120 students and 25 teachers were enjoying a break. Minutes later, amazed by 
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what was taking place at the Legislative Palace, the whole Academy was addressed by its 
principal, Colonel Fausto Cobo. He asked why the younger officers were the ones to 
support the people's fight against corruption. Students, teachers, and three generations of 
officers with lieutenant colonel and colonel rank, gathered in the Constitutional Assembly 
auditorium and unanimously voted to support the military-indigenous people movement. 
Colonel Cobo asked for time to think about their decision, until 11:00 A.M., and then he 
and six officers proceeded to Congress. 
Meanwhile, in the Congress the confusion was increasing. Soldiers and policemen 
thought that the military, who were arriving since early morning, were reinforcements 
sent to contain the indigenous people's occupation.  As they saw how the reinforcements 
were aiding the rioters, they became disconcerted. At the beginning policemen tried to 
stop the riot, but after seeing the military helping the rioters, they decided to retreat. At 
this moment Colonel Lucio Gutierrez disavowed the President of the Republic, the 
National Congress and the Supreme Court. He replaced them with a Sovereign Civic and 
Military Junta consisting of a triumvirate: Antonio Vargas President of the National 
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities (CONAIE), Colonel Lucio Gutierrez, and 
Carlos Solórzano (Ex-president of the Supreme Court). 
 
Three months earlier, Vargas and Colonel Gutierrez were discussing plans for 
political change.  Colonel Gutierrez was contacted by the CONAIE because of his well-
known leadership; they also knew about his formal protest to the General Staff 
concerning the recent activity of Mahuad's government. It is not known how many 
members of the military knew about the agreement between Gutierrez and Vargas. The 
ESPE captains knew about it. "The only certainty is that there was a tacit pact between 
the indigenous people and the colonels: if the movement advances and achieves a 
blockade of the three powers' seat, then officers will support them. At that moment they 
will make an entrance.”76 
 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
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On January 20, the previous morning, the Minister of Government, Vladimiro 
Alvarez, felt that the world was collapsing around him; he received secret information 
from the police about CONAIE's mobilization. The Minister approached the President 
while he was in a meeting with national and international monetary advisors, to tell him 
of the possibility of impending events.  Immediately, the President called the Defense 
Minister and Chief of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Carlos Mendoza and 
Chief of the Armed Forces, General Telmo Sandoval, requesting an explanation: 
Mendoza and Sandoval entered the room and the President demanded to 
know at once... Why, when one day earlier he was assured that the 
situation was under control, and now the march of the indigenous people 
to voice their discontent was reveled, that almost nothing had been done to 
stop it. Furious, he asked, what the military strategy was. Mendoza 
considered the President’s claims intolerable and in a heated tone 
answered that the Minister was putting ideas into the President's head. 
Mendoza also questioned the role of the police, and stipulated that if there 
was information it should first be shared with the armed forces, who were 
the ones in charge of security. Villaroel (Police General Chief) answered 
that it was his responsibility to inform the Minister of Government. 77 
 
The President maintained his heated tone and asked, "What have we won through 
your conversations with the indigenous people?" After some discussions between the 
President, the Minister of Government, the presidential advisor of indigenous topics, and 
the Minister of Defense, the last one pronounced: "Mister President, this moment I 
present my resignation. I will go right now, because I disagree with what you are saying. 
I am tired of listening to you. I do not want to know anything because these people are 
lying. They are not telling the truth, they are confusing you."78 The General stood up and, 
while he was leaving, said that there was the immediate need for cooperation between the 
military and police to stop any attempt against Congress. 
 




General Sandoval decided to organize a joint military and police operation 
between 10:00 and 11:00 PM. At 5:00 A.M. on the 21st, the Police General Chief 
informed the Minister of Government, that the operation was suspended under General 
Sandoval’s orders. At 09:00 A.M. the Minister of Government, the Minister of Economy, 
and the military and police leadership were together in a committee to resolve the crisis 
when they were informed of the events in Congress. Then the military generals 
apologized to the Minister of the Government and met with the General Staff. Thirty-one 
generals and admirals of the General's Council, along with a group of colonels were 
waiting for them.   The General Staff ordered an investigation of the details leading up to 
the events of the march.     
 
At 10:30 A.M., the generals examined all the information; the insurrection was 
limited to just the ESPE and War Academy officers. The General's Council decided a 
strategy: General Mendoza was put in charge of controlling the colonels, and General 
Sandoval was to communicate with former Vice-President Gustavo Noboa and arrange to 
transport him to Quito. The General's Council also considered it necessary to send a 
message to the President; they were announced to and received by the President at 1:00 
P.M.  
 
The Joint Command of the armed forces arrived at the meeting escorted by some 
colonels and advisors. Mahuad, irritated, asked, "And what is your decision?" Mendoza 
answered, "Mr. President, you had concluded the scenario of ratification, now you have 
to make a decision..." Mahuad, with the open palm of his right hand, struck the table 
twice, and exasperated, stated, "If you want to carry out a coup, do it, but do not expect 
my resignation." Without stopping, he reminded them about Colonel Gutierrez who was 
preparing an operation. Mendoza answered, "Careful, you can not get upset like this, here 
is all the General Staff... All the political parties are against you, economic bars, carriers, 
syndicates, indigenous people, mass media, farmers, students, Congress and even 
international organizations." Mahuad argued that if the Vice - President were to succeed 
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him, the same problems would continue. After some arguments, General Mendoza closed 
the dialogue pronouncing: "Excuse me, I'm leaving, we will stay here no longer." 
 
Mahuad tried to contact the Vice - President asking for a public pronouncement in 
his support, but Noboa answered that he was following the events and he would speak at 
the proper moment. Then, at 3:40 P.M., on the national network, Mahuad denounced the 
military coup. Half an hour later, General Sandoval, in public announcement also, 
informed the country that the armed forces no longer supported Mahuad. At the same 
time, General Moncayo was sent to the President; upon his arrival the Minister of 
Government warned the President about a possible detention.  Moncayo’s mission was to 
send a message to the President that the armed forces would not continue providing his 
security in the Presidential Palace. "President, you must abandon the Palace," General 
Moncayo said. "I will not do it," was the presidential answer.  Nevertheless, ten minutes 
later the President departed for the capital city's air force base; the President chose it 
because the air force did not support the coup and was independent of the Army. 
 
With the President out of the Palace, at 6:30 P.M., the Triumvirate started the 
procession toward it. Meanwhile, in the Independence Plaza (the central plaza of Quito, 
located in front of the Carondelet--the Presidential Palace), there was a resounding: 
"Guttierrez, Guttierrez!." But General Mendoza moved forward and entered the 
Carondelet declaring, "we have come to the power to put order to this chaos." There, 
Mendoza received a telephone call from Peter Romero, Assistant Secretary for Western 
Hemisphere Affairs at the Department of State of the United States.  He told the general 
that, "You have to maintain the democratic system, have to consider that Mahuad must 
continue as President," and asked if, until now, there was bloodshed. Mendoza replied 
"There is no bloodshed. We are avoiding it, avoiding a confrontation between militaries."  
 
At 10:00 P.M., in the Carondelet, generals, colonels and indigenous people got 
together. When the generals took their turn to speak, they presented a proclamation with 
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five points, but Vargas interrupted him, stating that, "we gave you the opportunity, and 
you did not accept it." Vargas continued, reminding them of an earlier conversation that 
the government had already been formed by Gutierrez, Solorzano and himself. He said, 
"You have in front the new Chief of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Colonel 
Fausto Cobo. As for today's events, generals, and your subordinates, we admire you all, 
but your duty here is over. The door is open and you are free to go." Mendoza responded 
immediately, "It can not happen. Officers, calm down and let us discuss the situation."  
Colonel Cobo, it comes to my attention that you, even though you worked with me, knew 
about the events. This constitutes treason... You, Colonel Cobo, can only do this over my 
dead body." 
 
In order to maintain the unity of the armed forces, Gutierrez ceded his place in the 
Triumvirate. Before departing he asked for protection for all the participants of the 
rebellion. At 11:44 P.M., the new Junta, went out onto the balcony and sang the National 
Anthem. Interim President Noboa gave a brief speech to the country.  Afterward the 
Triumvirate met, and Vargas opened the dialogue saying, "Beginning now, we start to 
govern; first it is necessary to end the emergency state..." Suddenly General Mendoza 
realized that he disagreed with the current situation and stood up and said, "gentlemen, 
excuse me, I will return later." At once he went to the Ministry of Defense and addressed 
the army generals, "Gentlemen, I confirm that at this moment I retire. Everything is ready 
to dissolve this Triumvirate. I am humiliated for my family who thinks that this is 
unworthy. General Sandoval, you take charge of the Joint Command and take care of the 
operation... I give you charge of the Armed Forces." 
 
At mid-night Sandoval arrived at the Carondelet, and convened 36 generals and 
admirals and explained  that he was in command and that  the power should be given to 
the Vice President. The Commandants of the Army, Navy and Police told him that they 
were with him and supported the Constitution. At 1:00 A.M. Mendoza returned to the 
Presidential Palace, and met with Vargas and Solorzano, who were preparing the first 
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executive decrees. Once all together, he expressed "Gentlemen, this is dissolved, I resign 
right now. My family disagrees; even my son feels that I am incapable of this task." 
Solorzano asked if he had to depart as well. "What else can you do?" Mendoza answered 
(meaning: Solorzano had no choice, he had to go).  Then Vargas asked, "So now you 
leave us?" "Now you stay alone" Mendoza replied (meaning: there was now no military 
support).  He ended the dialogue and left. At 3:00 A.M. former Vice - President Noboa, 
received the news.  By 7:00 A.M., at the Ministry of Defense, Gustavo Noboa took over 




By reading the transcript of the events surrounding the 2000 coup, it is possible to 
determine who was in control of the events. The corollary of democratic civilian control 
is that civilians are in control of the decision making process. By observing the 
expressions and lexicon of the individuals involved in the events of the 21st, one can 
deduce that the military officers were in control. 
 
The crises of 1996 and 2000 left important lessons and questions in civil military 
affairs. They show the problems Ecuador has encountered in an effort to establish 
democratic civilian control.  For example, the Minister of Defense was an active duty 
military officer during the 2000 crisis and there was a lack of oversight on the part of the 
judicial branch. These problems will be addressed in the next chapter, as will the civilian 
and military mindset, and the structure of state institutions to control the armed forces. 
The purpose is to assess the current situation in Ecuador toward achieving civilian 
control.    
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IV. ASSESSMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL 
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ECUADOR 
 
The second chapter explored the feasibility of the application of CMO in any 
given country, and established the fundamental requirements in order to not risk 
democracy with these types of operations. The third chapter introduced Ecuador as a case 
study. This chapter will concentrate on an evaluation of Ecuador's current situation for 
the application of CMO. 
 
To accomplish this, the chapter will be divided in three sections. Each section 
addresses one of the three fundamental requirements for the application of CMO in 
Ecuador. The first one deals with democratic civilian control (DCC) of the armed forces, 
an indispensable requirement for CMO. It concentrates on determining the level of DCC 
over the armed forces.  
   
The second indispensable requirement for CMO is the definition of a military 
mission. The next section describes the current situation in the northern border region of 
Ecuador. This section briefly describes the Colombian internal conflict, its infiltration 
into Ecuador, and the possible effects on the country. Based on the White Book of 
Ecuador79, the focus is to demonstrate that there is a military mission and a current 
external and internal threat on the northern border of Ecuador. 
 
The third fundamental requirement, civilian and military expertise will be 
addressed in the final section. Using a normative approach, this section will propose a 
joint civil-military operation as an innovative way of conducting CMO. This subchapter 
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introduces the idea of joint civil-military work in a real CMO activity and shows the need 
for education and training for both civilians and military participants.      
 
A. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL IN ECUADOR 
 
The purpose of this subchapter is to evaluate the degree of democratic civilian 
control (DCC) over the armed forces in Ecuador. It is composed of three sections. The 
first one analyzes DCC using a behavioral or subjective approach. It will explore the 
military mindset, as well as the civilian mindset, and its democratic values pertaining to 
civilian control. The second section will analyze DCC with a structural or objective 
approach.  It will examine how Ecuadorian legislation addresses DCC and how the 
institutions affected by the legislation are organized. Finally, the third section will meld 
both approaches and then make an assessment of DCC in Ecuador in order to evaluate the 
degree of DCC in the country. 
 
Overall, the degree of DCC is analyzed using the tools discussed in the second 
chapter and the historical review of the third chapter. That is, using Fitch's (behavioral or 
"subjective") and Bruneau's (structural or "objective") approaches as input to measure the 
degree of DCC and the output will be matched according to Trinkunas’ scope 
(jurisdictional boundaries chart80). 
 
1. Behavioral approach 
a. Military Mind 
As it is possible to see from the 1996 and 2000 crises, the lack of civilian 
control was more than evident, particularly in 2000. Hence, it is important to focus 
attention toward the set of values in the military and civilian minds, which were exposed 
through these events to decipher the roots of the barriers to a high level of civilian control 
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Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, pg. 178. 
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in Ecuador. In order to explore the Ecuadorian military mind, this section will match the 
historical events described earlier with the opinions of two of the ablest scholars working 
on the political behavior of the military in Latin America: Bertha Garcia, Director of 
Inter-American Studies at the Catholic Pontifical University in Ecuador, and J. Samuel 
Fitch Professor and Chair of Political Science at the University of Colorado in Boulder. 
  
For Bertha Garcia, Ecuadorian armed forces professed to be one of the 
most democratic in Latin America and one operating in the greatest harmony with 
civilians. Behind the "strategic obedience" to civilian power, a debilitating, complex 
system exists which has methodically worked to erode civilian power. Successive 
governments have been cleverly overthrown by this system of pressure exercised by the 
military leadership. 81  
 
This system of pressure at first appears neutral during a crisis event.   
Then, at a key moment, senior military leaders present different courses of action—
possible scenarios for resolving the crisis.  The pressure is applied when the officers 
"suggest" which course of action should be taken by the individual who holds political 
power.  The precondition is military support.  The military will take away their support 
for the government at a key moment to obtain drastic decisions or let the constitution 
break down, depending on the case. For García, at least three episodes confirm this 
uncommon maneuver in the latest years: the dismissal of former Vice-President Dahik 
because of charges of corruption in 1996, the withdrawal of military support to Bucarám, 
and the fall of Mahuad.  In this last episode, the situation went out of control for at least 
one group of military leaders, and the only alternative was to carry out a coup. 82 
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García believes that the lack of civilian democratic control is total. In her 
analysis, the only difference between the coups of the 1960s and 1970s and the "strategic 
pressures" on civilian governments during the 1990s was the social mobilization during 
the latter period.  She notes: 
The events of January 21, 2000 could have expressed the 'syndrome of 
crisis of mission'... as a 'defensive strategy' of the armed forces... in the 
relation between institutional and cooperative interest. The effect of the 
budgetary cuts carried out by Mahuad's administration due to the 
economic crisis affected military salaries, plans for the acquisition of 
military equipment, a 20% reduction in conscription, and prompted the 
deployment of 10,000 military personal to assist the police. All of this 
occurred without a governmental design of a new and clear military and 
defense policy matched to the new strategic situation of the country. The 
uneasiness diminished the military discipline.83  
  
According to J. Samuel Fitch, "The broad military consensus on living in a 
constitutional democracy masks growing division about the meaning of democracy in the 
Ecuadorian context and substantial uncertainty about the proper role of the military in a 
democratic regime."84 For him this is due to the "hyper-fragmentation of the Ecuadorian 
party system which leads inexorably to weak presidents... Second, the nature of previous 
military regimes in combination with the poor performance of civilian institutions since 
1979... Not surprisingly, a substantial majority of the civilian public favored the January 
2000 coup."85 Fitch agrees with García and expresses that, "it seems clear that a sector of 
the armed forces is no longer willing to subordinate itself to civilian authority."86 
 
The patterns of military behavior in Ecuador during 1996 and 2000 can be 
described, in Fitch's definition as "conditional subordination." "The military normally 
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does not speak publicly on policy matters and maintains its formal subordination to the 
president... even in crisis under current international conditions, military leaders may 
prefer to exercise their 'arbiter' role quietly behind the scenes rather than appear publicly 
as the 'guardians of democracy'."87 
Fitch surveyed Ecuadorian officers in 1991 to assess the political role of 
the armed forces. His research shows that 18% argued for subordination to constitutional 
authorities, 56% for constitutionally assigned missions, 15% for arbiter or guardians of 
national interest, and 3% for guardians of national security. In what the roles their beliefs 
played, 38% argued for democratic consolidation, 16% for classic professionalism, 35% 
for arbiter or guardian and even 11 % for tutelary guardians. 88  
 
This set of values was reflected in the two constitutional crises. In the first 
one, it might never become clear who looked for whom to intervene, but the fact is that 
the crisis ended once the armed forces supported the congressional decision. The civilian 
acceptance of the actions of the armed forces, in this case, constituted a failure in civil-
military affairs. The armed forces should never have been involved in the crisis; they 
should have let the political actors decipher the institutional crisis. If the values of 
civilian control were deeply assimilated into the military mindset, then the situation 
would have been resolved in a different way.     
 
The 2000 crisis was a coup d’etat; whether or not there was a 
preconceived plan within the armed forces is irrelevant. What is important to focus on is 
that the praetorian role which reappeared within the armed forces. It is important to 
concentrate on the foundation of this behavior. Is the reappearance of the guardian 
behavior an outcome of military participation in internal roles, or, once again, is it due to 
the lack of democratic values oriented toward civilian control? Further still, is this 
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behavior a natural reaction to poor governmental performance, or to the catastrophic 
economic conditions experienced by the country during those years?   
 
It is evident that the political role of the armed forces has increased since 
the mid-1990s. It is also a fact that the role of armed forces has not been circumscribed 
strictly to defense affairs. The historical events of 1996 and 2000 are an outcome of 
political and economic crisis, disastrous civilian governments, lack of strong democratic 
institutions, and also the lack of civilian control values within the civilian sector. These 
are the inputs, reasons and/or pretexts for the armed forces' entrance into the political 
arena. The military mindset toward democratic values could not remain passive in the 
face of the incompetence of the civilian governments. Nevertheless, it is also important to 
examine the lack of civilian interest in the discussion of this topic and the low value of 
civilian control in the civilian mindset. 
 
b. Civilian Mind 
The Ecuadorian experience had demonstrated that democracy can not 
exercise civilian control over the armed forces with a weak political 
system, incapable of producing effective leadership.89  
 
The lack of civilian control over the military, in the Ecuadorian case, is an 
outcome of two causes. The first is that military and civilian mindsets do not value 
democratic control. A military mindset continues to support their role as democratic 
arbiters, ready to exercise pressure to the incumbent government. The civilian mindset is 
similarly ready to overuse the military in the face of any adversity and without a clearly 
defined defense policy. The second cause is in an inefficient government structure, but 
surprisingly, as explained in the next section, not referring to defense institutions or 
organizations, rather referring to democratic institutions.   
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 The 1996 crisis exposed the lack of balance of power between the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches. The role of arbitrator in the political dispute 
between the legislative and executive branches belongs to the judicial branch. At any 
moment the judicial branch could have presented a resolution or ruling, or even brought it 
to the attention of society. Civilian control is not only exercised by the executive or 
legislative branch, it is also exercised by every institution of the state. In this case it was 
the fundamental responsibility of the judicial branch to resolve the crisis. This failure of 
the judicial branch is a symptom of the lack of democratic values in the civilian mindset. 
The lack of strong democratic institutions led the civilians to look to the military for a 
"constitutional" answer. 
 
In the 2000 crisis, the situation was worse. As Fitch explains, one of the 
roots of military political behavior is the weakness of the civilian politicians—evidenced 
by the inability of the different political actors to establish an agreement, fighting among 
the different sectors of society, and injustice. The result is an environment where only 
force rules. This was palpable in the social mobilization that occurred during those days. 
The riots were a forceful rejection of the government and its political and economic 
resolutions. In this situation, which is the institution in charge of force in the state? It is 
the military institution. Under these conditions, society gives a manifest invitation for 
armed forces intervention. Nonetheless, as previously expressed, it is the responsibility of 
the military to elude it. 
 
Garcia captures properly other sources of the problem in the civilian 
sector. There is not enough coordination between the civilian and military sectors to 
resolve national security problems especially in the formation of an effective mechanism 
for civilian control. Not the executive, nor the legislative, nor the political parties, nor the 
civil society have a clear position on this topic. Fitch agrees and maintains that, "Lack of 
civilian expertise in defense and military matters is clearly a major problem... Perhaps the 
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most striking manifestation of the high degree of civilian acceptance... is the absence of 
any provision in the 1979 Constitution for a permanent defense or armed forces 
committee in Congress."90 
 
Alvarez Grau, former Ecuadorian Minister of Government, stated in his 
exposition for the International Conference, "Small Countries toward Globalization: 
Society, Defense and Security," that, "unhappily in our democratic history, there is a lack 
of study in civil-military-political relations.  Only recently is this matter under research 
and study."91  
 
This becomes evident with the overuse of the military by the different 
governments since the return to democracy. A common attitude of the government since 
the return to democracy in Ecuador in 1979 is to confront social crisis, protests and riots 
with the declaration of "emergency stages" that involves temporal suspension of some 
constitutional rights and the deployment of the armed forces to secure the private 
property. In these stages, the President has the authority to deploy military forces to keep 
the order and confront the crisis. 
 
According to the article 180 of the Ecuadorian Constitution "The President 
of the Republic will declare state of emergency, in whole or part of the territory, in case 
of imminent external aggression, international war, great internal commotion or natural 
catastrophe." From 1979 to 2000 the Constitutional governments had declared on 54 
occasions a state of emergency, an average of 2.6 per year.92 This is a clear sign of 
overuse of the military to keep the order in political and economic crisis. The civilian 
mind is also responsible for the lack of civilian control over the military. 
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 The overuse of the armed forces is also evident in the request, or at least 
acceptance of the participation, of the armed forces in missions different from national 
defense. One example is the intervention of the armed forces in customs because of their 
earned reputation of honesty. Again, the problems of corruption cannot be resolved by 
the armed forces; it is a problem, which must be solved by other institutions of the public 
and also the private sector. It is important to note that the great acceptance the military 
institution has received in Ecuadorian society in general is due in part to the civilian 
sector.  They are the ones, who opened the doors for military intervention because they 
could not, or would not, find solutions to given situations themselves.  
 
Aside from these circumstances, the situation is not critical. The military 
does not influence the decision making process in, for example, Ministries of Education, 
Public Health, Public Works, Tourism, etc. There is a degree of autonomy of the armed 
forces, but the whole of the state is not under military rule. There is a kind of symbiosis 
between both military and civilians. Analyzing the current situation, it would be possible 
to maintain an initial degree of civilian control if military and civilian authorities are 
aware of the problems that they both face. However, it is important to determine whether 
the application of CMO would reduce even more the democratic values of civilian 
control in the civilian mind. The section III will examine CMO and how its multiplier 
effect may influence the consolidation of civilian democratic control of the armed forces 
in Ecuador.  In fact, the application of CMO may be covered in the schooling process for 
civil servants so that they can have a greater understanding of military behavior and this 
could promote healthy civil-military relations.      
 
2. Structural Approach 
As it was explained in the second chapter of this thesis, the structural approach 
examines the configuration of some key areas in order to determine the degree of civilian 
control of the armed forces. This approach considers the armed forces as a State's 
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institution.93 Following the same line, this section will base its analysis on exploration of 
Constitutional norms, organic laws and general laws that establish the configuration of 





                                                
Ministry of Defense, 
Legislative Branch, with special attention to the legislative committee of 
International Affairs and National Defense, 
Armed Forces in relation to the selection and promotion processes, and 
A brief inspection of the Intelligence Services. 
 
The first area to analyze is the organization of the Ministry of Defense and the 
relations between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Control is about who is 
in charge of the decision making process. Article seven of the armed forces' organic law 
establishes that the Ministry of Defense is the organization with the highest 
administrative level of the armed forces. If the goal is to achieve democratic civilian 
control, then the executive branch, explicitly the President, by delegation should be the 
one who selects a Minister of Defense. To achieve the highest level of civilian control, 
the Minister should be a civilian, because then the decision making process will belong to 
civilians—military personnel would assume advisory roles. Even in defense affairs, the 
goal is to have civilian control, and civilian command in the decision making process. 
   
In this regard, article 103 of the Constitution proclaims that it is a presidential 
faculty, and duty, to nominate and remove freely the ministers of the state. In 
concordance with this Constitutional norm, the armed forces' organic law, article eight, 
stipulates that the State Secretary of National Defense will be directed by the Minister of 
Defense. In reference to the designation of the Minister, the article expresses that the 
 
93 Class notes, NS 4225 Civil-Military Relations in Transitions to Democracy, Professor Thomas 
Bruneau, Civil Military Relations Curriculum, The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 
September-December, 2002. 
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President will select the Minister. If an active duty general officer is designated as 
Minister, he will immediately be placed in reserve status. In case of absence or temporary 
incapacity, the Chief of the Joint Command of the armed forces will assume the position.  
 
In practice, since the return to democracy, there has not been a civilian Minister of 
Defense. The structure is built to generate civilian control, but in reality military 
personnel have been involved in the decision making process as key figures and not as 
advisors. Former colonel, coup leader, and actual President, Lucio Guttierrez, was 
advised of this problem and in discussions with former President Mahuad, stressed the 
need for a civilian Minister.94 In this sense, a possible development in this area is 
expected. Nevertheless, the fact that the structure permits exceptions to civilian control is 
an important factor to take in to account. Also, the internal structure of the Ministry does 
allow the possibility of civilian personnel.  
 
Second, it is necessary to explore the rules and norms of the armed forces to 
discover how selection, promotion and retirement of military personnel is determined. 
The selection process advanced significantly in the Constitutional reforms of 1998. 
Article 188 instituted the principle of conscientious objection, by which if a person has a 
moral, religious or philosophic objection, the citizen can choose community service 
instead of the military conscription. This new allowance does not achieve civilian control 
per se, but the conversion from a historical universal mandatory conscription to this kind 
of voluntary service, represents a clear sign of the evolution toward civilian control.      
 
In the promotion process, article 171 of the Constitution grants the President 
authority to confer promotions to General Officers. In the promotion process of high, 
medium and low rank officers, and any enlisted promotions, the armed forces organic 
law, in articles, 42, 46, 52, 63 and 65, sets processes by which the senior ranks receive a 
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list of promotion candidates and determine by qualifications those who are promoted. 
There is no intervention by the legislative branch in this promotion process.   
 
Third, it is crucial to consider the role of the Legislature, focusing on the 
budgeting process, policy making and oversight. The budgeting process is complex.  
Article 130, numeral 13, determines that the National Congress will approve the national 
budget presented by the Executive Branch. Article 13 of the organic law for 
administrative and financial control (Ley Orgánica de Administración Financiera y 
Control [LOAFIC]), stipulates that the Ministry of Finance is the ruling organization in 
charge of the budgeting system. Article 24, numeral 7, establishes that the Minister of 
Finance will approve the budget of every institution, entity or enterprise that is ascribed 
to the Executive Branch, including the armed forces. Thereupon, the Minister of Defense 
submits a defense budget to the Minister of Finance who incorporates it into the national 
budget and at the same time submits it to the National Congress for approval. Because of 
its complexity, at the same time, it becomes difficult to exercise the proper control over 
the defense budget.   
 
The process of policy making, as explained earlier, allows civilian control, 
nevertheless, in practice the decision making process is highly militarized. To overcome 
this problem, for the first time in national history, and as an outcome of the commotion 
experienced in 1996 and 1998, a commission or committee of International Affairs and 
National Defense was established. The reform for civilian control in this regard is still 
developing, but there is not yet a fluent civil-military dialogue in the legislature. Powerful 
Congressional oversight, as is conducted in the United States, is being included but the 
process is moving slowly. However, this is another clear sign of positive structural 
reform.  
 
Some military control remains. Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the armed forces' regulations 
express that in imminent cases of international conflict or internal war, the President will 
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delegate to the Chief of the Joint Command of the armed forces power and command of 
the armed forces. This is problematic because in a democracy, even in these critical 
situations, the military’s role is to advise and the civilian role is to command the decision 
making process. A clear example supporting this observation is the current Gulf conflict. 
No one would expect that the head of the Department of Defense would take command of 
the U.S. military forces instead of the President of the United States. Nonetheless, also in 
this area, there are great improvements going on.  Once again, for first time in the defense 
history a White Book has been published. On December 12, 2002, with the participation 
of 15 national and international institutions and 49 experts, the policy of defense for the 
next 10 years has been published as an indication of transparency in the defense 
procedure.95 
 
Finally, control over the Intelligence Services is essential. In this case, the 
General Direction of Intelligence (Dirección General de Inteligencia), according to 
Article 51 of the National Police organic law, is under the jurisdiction of the Joint 
Command of the National Police. The General Direction of Intelligence is separate from 
military intelligence. It is in charge of collecting and processing intelligence information 
which is used to advise the Joint Command of the National Police. This structure gives 
the police, and specially the Minister of Government, a great degree of autonomy from 
the armed forces. This configuration has been a source of conflict between the armed 
forces and the national police, but the optimal structure would be to decentralize power 
and achieve civilian control of the intelligence services.  
 
In conclusion, it is possible in Ecuador to create and maintain a healthy structure 
to achieve a high level of civilian control, but it does not yet exist. There are some 
deficiencies; nonetheless, great improvements are evident. One important area needing 
correction is the non-existence of regulations that monitor the structure, processes, and 
orders inside the Ministry of Defense, as exists in every other Ministry. The legislative 
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committee for oversight of the armed forces needs more proximity with the executive 
branch and it is paramount that the political decision to designate, for the first time, a 
civilian Minister of Defense, actually occurs. As it stands, it is not always possible to 
sustain a high level of civilian control, even with the structure described in this section. 
But it is not possible also, to sustain that there is military control; it is possible and 
accurate to sustain that there is an initial degree of DCC, as it is required for the 
application of CMO. 
 
3. Assessment Of Democratic Civilian Control Over the Armed Forces: 
Ecuador As A Case Study.  
 
In the Ecuadorian case, like in the Latin American countries in general, because 
of their similar society and governmental system conformation and composition, it is 
important to combine the behavioral approach with the structural approach. In order to 
give an appropriate assessment of civilian control over the armed forces, it is important to 
inspect both approaches because, in practice, the structure is not enough to assess the 
situation. It is important to comprehend that the structures are controlled by a people who 
hold a set of values; therefore, it is critical to combine the structural and the behavioral 
approaches for a correct assessment. 
 
 
Non Democratic Regime   Transition to Democracy     Consolidated Democracy 
 




Military Control  Initial degree of DCC  Democratic Civilian Control 
 
Figure 2.   Baseline of Democratic Civilian Control (DCC) 
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As it was underscored in the second chapter, the baseline of jurisdictional 
boundaries will be the point where both approaches meet. For a didactic reason, the 
circles of Trinkunas' scale (see figure 2) will start at the "baseline of democratic civilian 
control."  The baseline indicates three basic stages, the first is where the military is in 
total control of state institutions, the second is where civilians are starting to achieve 
control, and the last is where civilians have complete control of state institutions. 
 
The baseline also presents a direct relation between military and civilian control 
over the political regime. In the first stage, the armed forces have total political control. 
In the Ecuadorian case this stage corresponds to the period before the return to 
democracy in 1979.  
 
The second stage corresponds to the point at which "the armed forces neither have 
nor feel a responsibility for the policies of the regime, it is easier for them to take a hands 
off attitude to the transition, by declaring themselves concerned only with protecting their 
own institutional values of stability and autonomy, as well as public order and national 
security."96 At the same time, the civilian sector starts to take control of the different 
institutions within the state. This stage begins with a transition to democracy. In this 
stage, the state policy toward education, public health, welfare, and public works, are 
transferred to civilian control. In the Ecuadorian case the end of 1970s and earliest 1980s 
corresponds to this stage. 
 
In the third stage civilian control is complete. As explained in the second chapter, 
even in defense affairs, the institutions are commanded by or in the control of civilians. 
Civilians play the role of decision-maker and military the role of advisors. This baseline 
is linear because the boundary lines between each stage are diffuse. Achieving civilian 
control over the armed forces is a daily process, it is a long term and continuous process 
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and even a well-consolidated democracy can fail in this process. In the Ecuadorian case, 
although democracy was thoroughly underway in the consolidation process, the mid-
1990s and succeeding events represented several steps back in achieving civilian control. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to maintain that there was an initial degree of civilian control. 
 
Ecuador accomplished an initial degree of democratic civilian control, and 
showed signs of continuing the process of complete civilian control. Ecuador has a 
Ministry of Defense and regulations that govern it which includes civilians in decision-
making positions. Since 1998, Ecuador also has a legislative committee to oversee the 
armed forces.  Several structural changes are still needed, but the process is going on.  
This fact is the first evidence of an initial degree of democratic civilian control in 
Ecuador.  
 
Military and civilians are also showing efforts toward collaboration on improving 
civilian control. The publication of the first White Book, and several national and 
international forums on this topic, lead by Professor Bertha Garcia, with participation 
from the civilian and military communities, is more evidence of the recovery. It is 
important to remark that before the incidents of the mid- and late- 1990s, Ecuador 
accomplished a great level of civilian control. The armed forces were giving up their role 
in state enterprises and concentrating only in defense affairs. It is also well known that 
the recovery process is harder than an initial construction process; nevertheless, there are 
positive signs of the recovery process showing other evidence of an initial degree of 
DCC. 
 
In conclusion, as a final assessment in this case study, it is possible to maintain 
that Ecuador has accomplished an initial degree of civilian control. Nevertheless, as 
stated in the theoretical chapter (Chapter II), in order to apply civil-military operations it 
is important to fulfill all the requirements. 
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B. ECUADORIAN MILITARY MISSION: THE NORTH FRONTIER SECURITY 
GAP  
 
The lack of integral plans for development and security in Esmeraldas, 
Carchi, Sucumbios and Orellana had opened a door for narcotic traffic 
activities. The control is insufficient.97 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the influence of the Colombian conflict 
on the north frontier and to evaluate the need for a military mission to confront it. The 
measures and governmental decisions taken to reduce and eventually end the negative 
impact of incursions at the north frontier on national security will be discussed. The 
information sources for this portion are predominantly newspaper articles and special 
descriptions from the White Book in order to understand why Ecuador chose to use 
security police to achieve order. 
 
It became evident over the past decade, when the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) shifted strategy and started collecting taxes from drug dealers, that 
they were getting into the drug business too. During the 1980s the route for narcotic 
traffic activity was Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Their government's abandonment of 
tenant farmers, and the extreme poverty of rural areas, were incubators for the 
development of the narcotic business in the Andean region.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, the guerrillas have used the northern area of Ecuador for 
supplies and recuperation. "But they are now coming in greater numbers... the FARC has 
established its presence in Sucumbios with its own radio station broadcasting 
propaganda."98 Today, Ecuador has the same problems as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia 
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during the 1980s. According to police reports, in the north frontier about 1500 square 
meters of coca plantations have been detected. In a "business" that produces 
approximately 50 billion dollars per year, the risk of the spread of this cultivation is quite 
evident, poor tenant farmer will easily shift to the profitable coca cultivation. With the 
spread of coca cultivation, other effects are also perceptible. Over 7,000 refugees, 
narcotic traffic, kidnappings and extortion are not only in this area, but also, in Quito and 
Guayaquil, the key cities in Ecuador.99 
 
The situation in the northern border is extremely alarming. "Locals in contact with 
the guerrillas claim that the FARC has a list of 300 people still to be executed. Hundreds 
of people have been kidnapped along the border, and inhabitants of six villages fled their 
homes at gunpoint when the FARC moved onto their land in February (2002)."100 Under 
these circumstances the need for security is evident. 
 
The most palpable effect of the north frontier gap is the rise in delinquency. In the 
region, criminal activity has reached unprecedented levels. During 2002, 139 
assassinations have taken place. According to the police, the violence is explained by the 
Colombian conflict itself and the extreme poverty of the region. In 2002 there were 12 
kidnappings also.101  
 
To understand the rise of delinquency it is possible to compare the rates of 
criminal activity between Ecuador and Peru. In the 1990s Peru's rate was 11.5 homicides 
per 100 habitants, and Ecuador had 10.3. By 1995, when the Colombian conflict started 
to show up, Peru's rate declined to 10.3 and Ecuador's rose to 13.4.102 According to 
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Cedatos, the rate of delinquency had increased six times over that of the population in the 
region and 12 times more than the national population. Between 1996 and 2000, illicit 
acts had risen from 64,377 to 92,034 per year, which represents an increase of 43%. The 
delinquency had risen in parallel to the levels of poverty according to Cedatos.103 Even 
more, the Police Commandant expressed on January 30, 2003, that there are signs of 
terrorist activities developing in the country.104    
 
The Joint Forces Quarterly Military Journal stated that, "the impact from 
increased counter-drug operations in Colombia remains unclear, though here preliminary 
indications are worrisome. Especially in the border area, the spillover from Colombian 
drug trafficking groups has burdened law enforcement and military personnel. The extent 
to which Colombia narcotic interest will move into Ecuador is not known."105 
 
The north frontier gap represents a real threat, as it is possible to observe. The 
threat can be felt in the boundary provinces and the entire country in general. The effects 
of the north frontier gap are being felt principally in the rise of criminal activity, as 
witnessed by the police, mass media and population in general. Now it is important to 
review whether governmental authorities should include the northern border as a threat 
and create a specific defense policy to address it.  Additionally, it is important to 
determine what type of military missions should be selected to confront the threat. It is 
also important to remember at this point, that civil-military operations are special 
complementary missions, complementary because it serves as an integration mechanism 
between the main military mission and the population. The second mandatory 
requirement for the application of these operations – the identification of a well-defined 
military mission to confront a specific threat --   is examined in this section.  It shows that 
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the Ecuadorian decision making process has decided upon the use of the armed forces in 
a clear military mission in the northern frontier. 
 
According to the Ecuadorian White Book published in December of 2002, one of 
the most significant issues is the evolution of the Colombian conflict and its effects on 





A rise in illicit activities related to narcotics trafficking and organized crime, 
An increase in Colombian refugees in the frontier provinces, 
Environmental damages produced by fumigation in the Colombian frontier, 
and 
Possibility that illegally armed delinquents will start operations in the 
Ecuadorian territory. 
This reveals that the north frontiers gap, according to the White Book is 
considered a threat to the security of Ecuador. The White Book as the main reference of 
the defense policy of the country has identified the area as a threat and considers it 
necessary to employ military missions in order to bring security in the region and the 
country.  
 
The White Book also reveals that the negative effects described above will 
demand permanent deployment of the armed forces in missions for the protection of the 
frontier and to guarantee the rule of law in the frontier communities. It also requests the 
involvement of intelligence, immediate reaction, and specially trained personnel, to name 
a few of the more important requests. The White Book also expresses the need to 
continue with missions for development, to improve the quality of life of the marginal 
population in areas where the presence of the state is not obvious. Although it does not 
give specific citations for civil-military operations, the White Book calls for specially 
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trained personnel and development missions—the two main characteristics of civil 
military operations.  
 
The decision making level has responded to societies' need for security. In 
practice, several actions have been taken. Manta's air base has been declared as the 
headquarters for sea-air surveillance for the north frontier. The surveillance will be 
accomplished by a joint marine-air force operation with the objective of controlling 
northern frontier subversive activity and protecting the oil pipeline.106 The military has 
already deployed 380 soldiers and 100 more are expected. During the last two years 
8,000 policemen have been trained to operate in the region.107 But the region demands 
more military presence to secure the zone.    
 
On the operational level, like in the decision making level, the Ecuadorian 
northern frontier gap is considered a security threat. Society, decision-makers and the 
armed forces perceive and understand the problem. Thus in Ecuador, the second 
mandatory requirement for the application of civil-military operations is fulfilled. 
Because of the conditions of the region, the state desolation and high levels of poverty, 
civil military operations can provide both development and security, thus the importance 
of it implementation. 
 
C. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH 
FRONTIER OF ECUADOR 
 
The third fundamental requirement for the application of CMO is civilian and 
military expertise in the development of CMO. It is important to clarify that traditional 
civil-military operations do not need civilian personnel. According to the international 
doctrine presented in the second chapter, these are complementary military operations. 
Their only purpose is to assist the principal military operation in the achievement of the 
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military objective. Nevertheless, civilian expertise might be the weakest link in the 
Ecuadorian case. 
 
The argument of this thesis is that the application of civil-military joint operations 
can solve the northern frontier security gap. The first two fundamental requirements for 
the application of CMO are fulfilled in the Ecuadorian case. With training and education 
in the application of these civil military operations, as a previous step for their 
implementation, the third requirement will be accomplished. The purpose of this section 
is to propose, using a normative approach, an innovative operation that joins civilian 
institutions and military institutions in the goal to close the gap in the Ecuadorian 
northern frontier. This section will describe the line of command for these operations, the 
different tasks of each institution and the decision making process in the development of 
the operations. 
 
1. Civilian and Military Personnel  
Esmeraldas, Carchi, Sucumbios and Orellana are Ecuadorian provinces 
neighboring Colombia. Esmeraldas is located in the coast, Carchi in the mountain range 
and Orellana in the Amazon. Each province has a Provincial Government, Council, and 
departments of Public Education, Public Health Care and Public Works. The Provincial 
Government has a governor appointed by the President of the Republic. The Provincial 
Council is headed by a councilor elected by the province. The departments of public 
education, public health and public works are subordinated to each State Minister. All of 
these institutions belong to the civilian authorities in charge of the design of CMO. 
 
Ecuador is divided into four defensive zones. According to the White Book, Joint 
Force No.1 Shyris is responsible for the provinces of Carchi, Imbabura, Pichincha 
Cotopaxi, Tungurahua, Chimborazo, Bolívar and the city of Quito.  The second Joint 
Force Libertad is responsible for the provinces of Esmeraldas, Manabí, Guayas, Los 
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Ríos, Galápagos and the city of Guayaquil; the third Joint Force Tarqui for the provinces 
of Cañar, Azuay, Loja, El Oro and the city of Cuenca; and the fourth Joint force 
Amazonas for the provinces of Sucumbíos, Orellana, Napo, Pastaza, Morona - Santiago 
and the Port of Francisco de Orellana. The commands of joint forces Shyris, Libertad and 
Amazonas belong to the military authorities, which must report progress to the civilian 
authorities regarding the application of CMO. 
 
The proposal consists of the application of civil-military operations in the three 
regions, the province of Esmeraldas in the coast, the province of Carchi in the mountain 
range, and the provinces of Sucumbios and Orellana in the Amazon. Thus, the Joint 
Force Shyris for the coast, Libertad for the mountain range and Amazonas for the 
Amazons will be the military operational units. In each province, the governor, provincial 
councilor and departments of public works, education and health care will become the 
civilian operational units. 
 
The local population plays a key role. It is important to invite and involve the 
local population. The calls of Mingas (voluntary communal labor) are well accepted 
when it is about developing social works. Since the society and the civilian authorities are 
asking for a greater military presence, it is important to take advantage of these 
circumstances.  
 
2. Civilian and Military Responsibilities 
One of the arguments against the application of CMO is that the armed forces 
expand their role by executing tasks that are not related to security affairs such as 
bringing education, health care and infrastructure to the undeveloped zones of a country. 
To avoid this danger, this proposal recommends that these tasks be executed by public 
workers or civil servants specialized in these areas. Every department involved in these 
operations will form units of state workers and civil servants assigned to the different 
locations where they are needed. 
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 The role of the armed forces will be fundamental, divided basically into three 
areas. First, the armed forces will be in charge of the deployment and security of the 
civilian personnel assigned to the different rural locations. Second, they have the 
responsibility to organize the population of the area to coordinate their participation in 
the evolution of the operations. Third, and most important, they must cooperate with 
civilian authorities in the design of the operations in order to achieve the military mission 
of control, security and surveillance of the Ecuadorian northern frontier. 
 
Military authorities will have the difficult task of matching the military missions 
with these operations. But at the same time, military authorities will learn in the field how 
civilian control works. In these operations, they will have an advisory role, explaining to 
civilians when and how these operations can be undertaken without risking the civilian 
personnel involved. Civilian authorities will also learn to address civil-military affairs by 
designing these operations according to the needs of the population. These operations can 
be a challenge with a positive outcome in civil-military relations, and civilian control in 
particular. 
   
3. Line of Command and Decision Making Process 
It is difficult to propose a specific line of command. Several local authorities can 
form a panel, counting on the assistance of Minister Delegates, and in association with 
military authorities that will assess the panel. The important point is to form a civilian 
command that will have the responsibility to build the provincial program of operations. 
In order to fulfill this responsibility, it is indispensable to open dialogue with the military 
authorities and to match the social projects with the military missions.  
 
Military authorities have the responsibility of advising the civilian authorities in 
the design of the operations. Their advice should focus on evaluating the different choices 
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and schedules that can be employed in the application of these operations. This will be a 
great opportunity to develop a real dialogue between civilian authorities and military 
authorities, where both will learn how to achieve a common goal—which is the security 
and development of the region. 
 
4. Benefits in the Application of Civil-military Joint Operations  
Civilian and military joint operations have a direct impact on civilian control, 
legitimacy of the government and democratic consolidation. In civilian control, these 
operations become a field experience and challenge for civilian and military authorities to 
learn how to work together and to embrace better civil-military relations. This is a 
fundamental step in the process to achieve civilian control. The mindset and behaviors for 
both groups will be shaped according to civilian control values. 
 
The extreme poverty of the rural locations in the northern frontier can become the 
cradle of delinquency and subversion in the region. The statistics exposed in this chapter 
shows that insecurity is rising to unprecedented levels. With insecurity and poverty the 
government loses legitimacy because the population feels abandoned by the State. 
Subversive and negative elements that are already operating in the region could take 
advantage of this. By the application of these operations, with a military presence to give 
security to the population and the development of social projects, the population will 
identify with the government, giving it legitimacy and support to it. The circle closes with 
strong ties to the democratic consolidation process. Once the government gains 
legitimacy, the democratic consolidation processes also get stronger, as explained in the 
second chapter.  
 
In conclusion, with this kind of operations the third and last fundamental 
requirement for the application of CMO will be fulfilled.  Nevertheless, it is important to 
mention the need for instruction and training for civilians and military personnel 
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participating in CMO. Training and instruction is the first step, as was explained in the 
second chapter. 
 
This kind of operation is the starting point of the multiplier factor toward civilian 
control, governmental legitimacy and democratic consolidation.  CMO, if applied with 
the fundamental requirements of initial democratic civilian control, a military mission, 




V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
Civil-military operations were part of the internal role expansion of the armed 
forces in Latin America between the 1960s and the early 1990s. These internal roles were 
commonly linked with the praetorian mind and tutelary attitude of the military and 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century. 
Nevertheless, the problems of lack of respect of human rights and hindrances to the 
spread of democracy were outcomes of the internal role expansion of the armed forces.  I 
have argued that the lack of democratic civilian control values in the armed forces, as in 
the civilian sector, and weak governmental structures are the possible causes.  
 
The armed forces constitute an institution within the state. Under this 
consideration, democratic civilian control is not related to the tasks performed by the 
institution, but rather to the commander or leader the institution. Thus, the applicability of 
civil-military operations as one of the internal roles or missions is in direct relation with 
the degree of democratic civilian control over the armed forces. In this perspective, for 




Initial degree of democratic civilian control, 
A well defined military mission, and 
Civilian and military expertise in the application of CMO.  
 
Ecuador as a case study partially fulfills these fundamental requirements. Ecuador 
has an initial degree of democratic civilian control manifested in an almost consolidated 
structure for civilian control—although changes and progress in this area are expected. 
Civilian and military behavior must improve on instilling civilian control values, 
nevertheless, it is possible to claim that Ecuador has an initial degree of civilian control. 
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The spillover of the Colombian conflict is starting to show its effects in Ecuador. 
In the last years the Ecuadorian northern frontier had become an entrance for subversive 
and delinquent elements into the country. The rise of delinquency and insecurity demand 
the implementation state policies to confront this problem. At the same time, poverty is 
the common denominator in the northern frontier region, making the current situation of 
the area more complicated. 
 
The military mission to close the gap of the northern frontier is evident and 
demands an immediate response from the state. The state has an obligation to employ all 
the institutions that are at its disposal to answer the society's demands for security and 
development. One of the tools to fulfill this duty is the application of Civil Military 
Operations (CMO).  
 
The proposal for civil-military joint operations, where the armed forces join with 
other state institutions for the application of CMO opens a bridge between civilian 
authorities, military authorities, civilian and military personnel, and the local populations 
of rural areas. These operations configure the perfect scenario and opportunity to instill 
democratic civilian control values in military and civilian authorities, and the chance to 
learn and practice democratic civilian control in the field of operations.  
 
The extreme poverty of the northern frontier region combined with its abandoned 
condition creates favorable circumstances for the incursion of subversive and delinquent 
elements into the area and thus the country in general. The military responsibilities of 
CMO include: having charge of deployment, security for the personnel and population, 
and report an assessment to the local and provincial authorities. Civilian responsibilities 
include being in charge of bringing education, health care and public works to the rural 
locations.  These are important state tools for establishing security and at the same time 
foster development in the Ecuadorian northern frontier region. 
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 When the state responds to society's demand of security and development, the 
legitimacy of the government rises. The multiplier effect of the application of civil-
military operations constitutes an engine to promote the government legitimacy and 
support the democratic consolidation processes. 
 
Under these circumstances, the implementation of civilian and military joint 
operations is highly recommended in the Ecuadorian current situation. It is also important 
to mention the need for more education and training for civilians and military personnel 
in civil-military relations, and particularly in the application of these operations. With 
more experienced personnel in this area, the evolution of these operations will give the 
country a great opportunity to close the gap of the northern frontier.  Additionally, it will 
bring development and hope to the Ecuadorian population of the region and security to 
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